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(MIS)APPROPRIATED LIBERTY: IDENTITY,
GENDER JUSTICE, AND MUSLIM PERSONAL
LAW REFORM IN INDIA
CYRA AKILA CHOUDHURY*
"Muslims, particularly, are an undigested lump in the
throat of Hindu professionals. They must be absorbed-
that is Hinduized-or coughed up. "I
"The Religious Right is writing the obituary to
imagination, imagination that is born of diversity,
difference, dissent. And in India, it is doing it in and
through the discourse of secularism. ,,2
Muslim women in India often find themselves caught between
loyalties to their religious or ethnic communities and a desire for greater
freedom and equality as women within those communities.3 They face
significant constraints in reconciling these conflicting influences, and a
great many of them do it in the context of poverty. As Zoya Hasan notes,
"Muslim women are triply disadvantaged-as members of a minority, as
* Assistant Professor of Law, Florida International University, College of Law. I
thank Georgetown University Law Center for providing generous support through their
Future Law Professor fellowship. Further, this Article has benefited greatly from the
comments and generous supervision of Lama Abu-Odeh and Robin West. I also appreciate
the helpful comments and suggestions of Emma Coleman Jordan at Georgetown. I dedicate
this Article to the memory of my grandparents, A.Z.M.B and Rowshan Jabeen Mozumder
and Abdul Hannan and Fatema Begum Choudhury who lived through riots, partitions, civil
war, and a number of other upheavals in South Asia but never let hate settle in their hearts,
and to the women in my family who continue to question, resist, and lead the way, and to
Magda, Suraiya and Zaina who will change the world.
1 Granville Austin, Religion, Personal Law, and Identity in India, in RELIGION AND
PERSONAL LAW IN SECULAR INDIA: A CALL TO JUDGMENT 15, 21 (Gerald James Larson ed.,
2001).
2 Ratna Kapur, The Fundamentalist Face of Secularism and Its Impact on
Women's Rights in India, 47 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 323, 332 (1999).
3 See, e.g., ZOYA HASAN & RiTU MENON, THE DIVERSITY OF MUSLIM WOMEN'S
LIVES 6-7 (2005) [hereinafter DIVERSITY OF MUSLIM WOMEN'S LIVES].
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women, and most of all as poor women."4 On one hand, traditionalists
within Muslim communities in India seek to universalize and ossify
interpretations and practices of Islam that maintain women's status as
second-class members with far fewer rights than men. Resistance to
conservative interpretations of Islam is cast as disloyalty and can call into
question the very identity of a Muslim woman within her community. On
the other hand, loyalty to religious interpretations and to principles that are
clearly gender-biased calls into question Muslim women's commitment to
emancipation and gender justice.5 These experiences are exacerbated for
women who are economically impoverished.6
In spite of these opposing forces, Muslim women continue to
struggle articulately for their rights at the crossroads and margins of Indian
and Indian-Muslim society. Although they have made progress, Muslim
women are still subject to a separate code of religious family law that, after
4 Id. The intersection of subordinations has been well theorized in the United
States by Kimberld Williams Crenshaw, Emma Coleman Jordan, Adrien Katherine Wing and
others in the Critical Race Feminism movement. See, e.g., CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A
READER (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 2003). Like Black women in the United States,
Muslim women have been the targets of racialized sexual violence. Their interests have been
subordinated to those of Muslim males, and when they have achieved success in the courts,
that success has often been cast as retribution or punishment of Muslim males, thereby
pitting women against men. See, e.g., Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Mapping the Margin:
Intersectionality, Identity Politics and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV.
1241, 1242, 1250-63 (1991). Indeed, one could transpose the term "racial" or "race" for
"communal" or "ethnic" here. This Article uses the term "racism" at certain moments simply
because it is a familiar idiom in the West. However, theorists of communal relations in India
have used other terms, most notably "ethnic," to describe the difference between Muslims
and Hindus. Neither race nor ethnicity (regardless of its broad definition) quite captures the
religious dimension of difference between Hindus and Muslims. Where the members of the
two communities share a language, customs, economic status, and history, labeling the two
as separate ethnicities does not adequately reflect the narrowness of difference when it is
only along the single dimension of religion. See, e.g., ASHUTOSH VARSHNEY, ETHNIC
CONFLICT AND CIVIC LIFE: HINDUS AND MUSLIMS IN INDIA (2003). For the most part, this
Article uses the most common descriptor of religious difference that has come to signify
Hindu-Muslim discord, which is "communalism." Communal is defined in the Compact
Oxford English Dictionary as "1 shared or done by all members of a community. 2 (of
conflict) between different communities, especially those having different religions or ethnic
origins." COMPACT OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH 195 (3d ed. 2005),
available at http://www.askoxford.com/conciseoed/communalview=uk.
5 See, e.g., Ratna Kapur, The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric: Resurrecting the
"Native" Subject in International/Post-Colonial Feminist Legal Politics, 15 HARV. HUM.
RTS. J. 1 (2002).
6 See DIVERSITY OF MUSLIM WOMEN'S LIVES, supra note 3.
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being codified nearly seventy years ago, has never been reformed and is
outdated. Under this code, Muslim women continue to be disadvantaged.'
This Article argues that, in order for Muslim women to be fully
emancipated from an unjust and discriminatory family law, their unique
position and experience at the intersection of gender discrimination and
religious discrimination must be taken into account.8 Proposals for reform
that fail to reconcile communitarian religious loyalty and the importance of
Muslim-Indian identity with individual gender rights will hold little appeal
for the majority of Muslims. 9 This Article argues that Muslim Personal
Law has become so interwoven with significance for Muslim identity that
dismantling the law or even reforming it constitutes a threat to this identity.
This is true regardless of the fact that the actual impact of the formal law on
the everyday lives of Muslims may be minor.
Furthermore, the way in which Indian secularism operates
reinforces religious identity and protects religion in the public sphere.
Following the ancient maxim sarva dharma sambhava, or "all religions are
valid," India's founding fathers wrote respect for all religions into the
constitution. This allows each religious community to be governed by its
particular set of family laws, while a universally applied secular law
governs all other areas of the law. However, this respect for religious
pluralism has come at the cost of many women's rights.10 It has meant that
7 See, e.g., Indira Jaising, Gender Justice and the Supreme Court, in SUPREME BUT
NOT INFALLIBLE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF THE SUPREME COURT IN INDIA 288, 298-99 (B.N.
Kirpal et al. eds., 2000).
8 It should be noted that this Article continues to place an emphasis on formal laws
as one avenue of relief from subordination. Many feminist political and legal theorists have
criticized such reliance or faith in the law. This Article recognizes the limits of the law to
impact social norms and effect substantial change in the lives of women, and takes up these
considerations in the final section. For an example of this critique in the Indian context, see
DIVERSITY OF MUSLIM WOMEN'S LIVES, supra note 3, at 4 (critiquing the focus on Muslim
Personal Law); NIVEDITA MENON, RECOVERING SUBVERSION: FEMINIST POLITICS BEYOND
THE LAW 3-9 (2004) (critiquing the reliance on "rights" and the law in effecting positive
change).
9 See Pratibha Jain, Balancing Minority Rights and Gender Justice: The Impact of
Protecting Multiculturalism on Women's Rights in India, 23 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 201
(2005); Vrinda Narain, Women's Rights and the Accommodation of "Difference": Muslim
Women in India, 8 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 43, 50-58 (1998); Vijayashri Sripati,
Human Rights in India-Fifty Years After Independence, 26 DENy. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 93,
132 (1997).
10 Not all Muslim women are impacted in the same way by the Personal Laws. For
example, poor women who have less ability to bargain for better dowers or resist divorce, as
well as women who are less able to avail themselves of the law, are clearly disparately
2008]
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Muslim Personal Law remains in the limbic state of being subject both to
state intervention, through codification and enforcement, as well as non-
intervention, as part of the private religious sphere of Muslims. This Article
explores this impasse and its effects on formal gender injustice and
inequality in the areas of dower, marriage, divorce, and maintenance under
Muslim Personal Law.
In order to eliminate these inequalities and injustices encoded in the
law, a number of solutions have been advanced. This Article evaluates the
two most enduring solutions. First, there has been a recurrent call for the
passage of a uniform civil code (UCC) that would either supplant personal
laws entirely, resulting in the abolishment of state recognition of religious
law, or offer an "opt-in" alternative, under which each woman can choose
(at the time of her marriage or in later litigation of family law issues) to
have the union governed by either secular or religious law. Support for the
UCC has come from the Hindu Right, which demands the abolition of
personal laws generally. Support has also come from secular feminists both
within and outside of India, including Muslim secular feminists, who
generally prefer the half-measure of an opt-in code. The second solution,
offered by Muslim traditionalists, calls for a more faithful and strict
application of existing Muslim law. Proponents claim this is both just and
protective of women.
Neither the secular feminist UCC nor the traditionalists' solution is
adequate to provide Muslim women the rights they deserve. I The secular
feminist approach of an opt-in UCC fails to recognize certain key
limitations. First, it assumes that a robust secularism exists in India and
would produce a code that operates neutrally across all religions. Second, it
assumes that there is political will for gender justice, as opposed to, for
instance, gender protectionism based on patriarchal notions of
impacted by formally unequal laws that they cannot mitigate. This is true of all Indian
women regardless of which personal law they are subject to and it is often the case that poor
Hindu and Muslim women have more in common with each other than with wealthier
women of the same religion. See, e.g., ZOYA HASAN & RITU MENON, UNEQUAL CITIZENS: A
STUDY OF MUSLIM WOMEN IN INDIA 4-8 (2004).
1 The Hindu Right's solution of abolishing personal laws and replacing them with
a "secular" code has been shown to be a thinly disguised attempt to assimilate minorities. As
such, feminists have abandoned it as a wholesale approach and it is therefore not treated with
any depth in this Article. Rather, the focus of this Article is on the most popular feminist
version of the UCC solution, an opt-in code. See Nivedita Menon, Women and Citizenship,




womanhood.12 An examination of the influence of the Hindu Right in
Indian politics and on secular institutions reveals that neither of these
assumptions is warranted. Therefore, a "secular" code would be unlikely to
operate neutrally or give women the kind of equality and justice they desire.
Moreover, a secular opt-in marriage law already exists. Examining this law
reveals the limits of Indian secularism and its vulnerability to
majoritarianism. 13 The opt-in UCC approach also fails to recognize the
limits of formal rights and makes assumptions about the effects of these
rights that may not be defensible.
Traditionalists, on the other hand, take the position that Islamic law
already adequately provides for women's rights, and that all that is required
is more robust enforcement. Relying on the divinity of the Islamic law,
traditionalists further argue that human reform of the law is unadvisable, if
not forbidden. 14
These two dominant options pose a difficult choice between a
secular code that requires women to abandon religion and acceptance of a
traditional patriarchal construction of religious law. This Article offers a
third approach-albeit also a half-measure-to improving Indian-Muslim
women's lives. This Article argues for an intermediate move that couples a
renewed commitment to personal law reform-through direct community
action and with the support of secular feminists-with the drafting of a
mandatory Uniform Civil Code with a feminist focus advocated for by
secular feminists. This dual approach, inspired by the grassroots efforts of
Muslim women in India and worldwide,' 5 pushes both the Muslim
traditionalists and the state to move women's rights forward. It is more
likely to succeed because it creates pressure both within the community and
on the state to change, but does not threaten the edifice of personal laws, at
least in the short term. This approach, which argues that religious laws are
flexible and capable of being just, preserves the role of religion in family
law while challenging religion to meet women's substantive justice
demands. It is a solution that has not been seriously considered by secular
feminists who assume that religious laws can only be patriarchal and
12 See generally Brenda Cossman & Ratna Kapur, Secularism's Last Sigh?: The
Hindu Right, the Courts, and India's Struggle for Democracy, 38 HARV. INT'L L.J. (1997).
13 id
14 See infra notes 219-221 and accompanying text.
15 See, e.g., Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399, 1399-1472
(2003) (discussing the work of Women Living Under Muslim Laws and its efforts to
redefine Muslim identity).
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unjust-a curious mirroring of the position of religious traditionalists who
make similar claims of immutability. Further, this approach recognizes that
personal law is an important element of Muslim identity and that attempting
to remove it would be considered a threat to the community. At the same
time, it challenges Muslims and other religious minorities to commit to the
secular nature of the Indian State and to move toward a universally-applied
code that realizes the social justice concerns of Islam. Though the code may
not be a religious document, if properly drafted without communal bias, it
can and should be construed as not conflicting with Islamic norms and,
therefore, as legitimate.
Before discussing the legal reform proposals, two contextual
considerations require elaboration in Part I. First, in order to explain why
personal law is such an important symbol to Muslims in India, so much so
that any attempt to reform it by the state has been met with strident and
successful resistance, a genealogy of a specifically "Muslim" identity is
key. The purpose of tracing this history is to illuminate how religious legal
concessions made by the British in order to create a separate group became
entrenched as the bedrock of Muslim identity in the Indian State. Moreover,
this genealogy demonstrates how the independence movement later used
religion to reinforce the separation of Muslims from "Indians." It also
shows how Muslims began to see themselves as a separate political identity
group with specific, common needs for representation and security in a state
increasingly defined and created by majoritarian discourse. The genealogy
also explains, to some degree, the reasoning behind traditional Muslims'
unwillingness to shed the personal law system entirely.
A second genealogy, that of Indian secularism, helps to explain
how secularism in India has been able to accommodate religious law and
practice in ways that reinforce separation and make it difficult to enact a
civil code that supersedes personal law. Moreover, it puts the role of
religion in public life into context and underscores the strikingly different
attitudes regarding secularism of Indian jurists and constitutionalists as
compared to their American counterparts. This second genealogy,
consequently, explains the different evolutions of jurisprudence regarding
religion in the public sphere.
With this historical background in place, Part II lays out the black
letter of Muslim Personal Law. While Muslim Personal Law covers a
number of areas, this Article focuses on the most contentious: dowry,
marriage (including polygamy), divorce, and maintenance. One important
reason for laying out the law in this manner is that customary practice is too
often mistaken for law, even when the two conflict. By clarifying what the
law actually is, rather than assuming that it is unjust, this Article gives the
[Vol. 17:1
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law a more even-handed treatment than it has previously received.' 6 This
Article concludes that although Muslim Personal Law is inevitably gender-
biased, as can be expected of any family law codified seventy years ago, it
is amenable to reform, as evidenced by changes to law in other Muslim
countries. However, reform of the personal law is only one option in an
array of competing options available to the Indian legislature, the judicial
establishment, and to Muslims.
Part III of this Article analyzes the two main solutions to Indian-
Muslim women's inequality as outlined above: an opt-in UCC and the
"better adherence/application" approach of Muslim traditionalists. By
analyzing the underlying assumptions made by proponents of these
solutions, this Article shows that the assumptions are unwarranted and
ultimately render the solutions unworkable. In their place, this Article
presents a different solution that calls for a dual approach combining a
movement towards gender justice in both religious and secular
communities.
Finally, Part IV considers the place of law reform in feminist
activism and the arguments against investing energy in law reform. First,
feminist activists and scholars argue that the black letter law is limited in its
ability to genuinely effect transformation in society. The second argument
concerns the (im)possibility of "women" as coherent legal subjects and the
desirability of inscribing the boundaries and enshrining the definition of
"womanhood" through and in the law. Both of these arguments call into
question the legitimacy of legal reform and its effects. While recognizing
the importance of these arguments, this Article argues that law reform
remains a significant avenue by which to broaden the scope and change the
negative effects of the rules governing women's lives.
Managing conflicting allegiances of religion and gender in a
political climate of hostility is not easy. Nevertheless, the rights of Indian
Muslim women should not be sacrificed in order to preserve a group
identity, whether that group is "women" or "Muslims." This Article
presents a solution which makes such a sacrifice unnecessary. More
effective than a single solution that forces Muslim women to make a
seemingly impossible-and certainly unfair-choice is an approach
combining movements for internal reform: pressure from Muslims by
Muslim women and pressure from a feminist-led movement towards a
uniform civil code that preserves rights and distributions of wealth
benefiting women. By bringing both sides of the debate substantively
16 See generally supra note 9 and accompanying text (these authors assume that the
Muslim Personal Laws are uniformly discriminatory to women).
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closer, women will have less difficulty reconciling their intersectional
position.
I. A GENEALOGY OF IDENTITY AND SECULARISM IN INDIAN
LAW
A. Muslim Identity and Personal Law: Personal Law as Muslim
Identity
The following section traces the history of Muslim identity,
beginning with the codification of Muslim law by the British from the
independence movement era until partition. The idea of Muslims as
different from other Indians, and the role of law in creating that identity, has
its genesis in the Mughal period which lasted from the sixteenth to the mid-
nineteenth century. When Muslim rule was introduced in India during this
time, the legal system was bifurcated into public and private spheres
governed by two distinct traditions of law: the former by Islamic and
temporal law and the latter by the particular religious law of the parties.17
The Mughal policy of allowing non-Muslims to be governed by their
religious family and inheritance law was continued by the British, who
extended it to all religious communities including Muslims. 18 Thus, in
17 ARCHANA PARASHAR, WOMEN AND FAMILY LAW REFORM IN INDIA: UNIFORM
CIVIL CODE AND GENDER EQUALITY 60 (1992); Rajeev Dhavan & Fali S. Nariman, The
Supreme Court and Group Life: Religious Freedom, Minority Groups, and Disadvantaged
Communities, in SUPREME BUT NOT INFALLIBLE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF THE SUPREME COURT
IN INDIA 256, 257 (B.N. Kirpal et al. eds., 2000). Pre-colonial India was not a unified state
ruled by a single Emperor. Rather, it was a collection of princedoms with both Hindu and
Muslim rulers governing a population diverse in faith, language, and custom. While the
Mughal monarchs acknowledged the supremacy of shari'a, they also used the qanun-i-shahi,
or the law of sovereigns, to extend their temporal power. As minorities ruling a very
different majority, they allowed Hindus and other religious communities to be ruled by their
own personal laws (family law) while reserving to themselves the right to impose Islamic
civil and criminal laws and the qanun-i-shahi without regard to religious difference. Thus,
for Muslims, there was no distinction between the private and the public realms; with regard
to the law, they were subject to Muslim law in all spheres of their lives. For all other
religious communities, however, by the time the British became a permanent ruling presence
in India, the distinction between personal laws and public law was already in place. See
AYESHA JALAL, SELF AND SOVEREIGNTY: INDIVIDUAL AND COMMUNITY IN SOUTH ASIAN
ISLAM SINCE 1850, at 140 (2001) [hereinafter JALAL, SELF AND SOVEREIGNTY].
18 The first attempt by the British to sort out the legal morass of religious and
temporal laws came from the privately-owned mercantile East India Company. See
PARASHAR, supra note 17, at 61-63. The Company began by setting up courts in certain
towns to administer justice within their "factories." Eventually, under charter from King
George I, they set up mayoral courts, although they had no jurisdiction over Indians. Id.
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British India, all subjects were governed by secular public law and religious
private/personal law. Through this practice, law and religious identity have
remained closely connected. However, the notion that Muslims were of a
different ethnicity altogether did not develop until after the Mughal period.
It arose from the enumeration of Muslims as a separate category in the
census, the creation of separate electorates, the codification of religious
laws for India's religious communities, and the administration of these laws
by the colonial judiciary during the independence movement.1 9 In fact, this
separation by the British was exploited by both Congress and Muslim
leaders during the anti-colonial struggle, thereby consolidating a separate
Muslim identity with both religious and political dimensions.
Nevertheless, one of the most important steps toward legal
recognition of difference was the process of codifying religious laws.
Codification of religious law was a complicated undertaking. Although
there were textual sources for both Hindu and Muslim law before the advent
of British authority over the courts, a dizzying array of customary practices
complicated the matter of finding the law that should be applied in any
particular case.20 The complexities of such variant practices and norms of
Finding the local alternatives inefficient and unpredictable, people outside the factories
began resorting to these courts, and the Company obtained the right to civil administration
from the Mughal ruler in Delhi. Id. Believing that the efficient administration of justice was
in the colonists' economic interest, Warren Hastings, the first Governor-General of the East
India Company, submitted a plan in 1722 for the establishment of both civil and criminal
courts. Id. at 62. With this move, all civil and criminal matters were brought under the
control of the British. Id. at 62. However, setting up courts with jurisdiction did not resolve
the issue of what substantive law was to be applied to the various disputes that arose. Article
xxiii in Regulation II of 1722 "explicitly saved for the Hindu and Muslim communities the
right to apply their own religious laws in the matters of inheritance, marriage, caste, and
other religious usages and institutions." Id. at 62. However, it shed no light on what
precisely that law was.
19 The ideological creation of Muslim Personal Law has had the effect of creating
Indian-Muslims. This is not to say that the Indian-Muslim community is monolithic. On the
contrary, there are several groups that jockey for position within each sub-community, there
are sectarian divisions between Sunnis and Shi'as, and there is a sizeable educated Muslim
contingent of staunch secularists. Indeed, the varied nature of Indian-Muslims creates a
certain amount of difficulty in speaking about "Indian-Muslims" at all. However, this Article
is primarily concerned with those elements of the community who are most visible, hold the
most political leverage, and are able to block reform. Such elements would include the All-
India Muslim Personal Law Board, Ahl i-Hadith, and other conservative groups.
20 See Michael R. Anderson, Islamic Law and the Colonial Encounter in British
India, in INSTITUTIONS AND IDEOLOGIES: A SOAS SOUTH ASIA READER 165, 176-78 (David
Robb & Peter Robb eds., 1993), available at http://www.wluml.org/english/pubs/pdf/
occpaper/OCP-07.pdf.
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several religious communities were forcibly simplified by the British into
codes that could then be applied by judges in a more systematic manner. 21
However, ignoring the local and customary practices meant that such
codification of the so-called "personal law" created a sizeable gap between
the reality of social practices and the code.22 In other words, the laws that
the codes purported to fix into a coherent form were non-normative. Even
so, the process of codification resulted in the Muslim Personal Law and the
Hindu Code which British judges began to apply to their respective
religious communities.23
There were politically expedient reasons for the British to
accommodate Hindu and Muslim personal laws and custom, rather than
overriding them with English liberal, universalist legal norms. 24 First,
21 id
22 See JALAL, SELF AND SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 17, at 145 (discussing the Punjab
and North Western Frontier districts). While the dharmashastras, which are the Hindu
religious laws, were being codified, Muslim laws were also transmogrified from a law that
applied in both the public and the private realms-indeed, a legal system-into a law that
operated only in the private sphere of family. Although, in reality, adherence to the shari'a
has been heavily mediated by local custom and legal norms (with the latter often taking
precedence), shari'a is not understood as a choice for Muslims. As such, relegating shari'a
to family and "personal" matters presents an odd incongruence: as a divinely decreed law, it
is meant to be obeyed in every field including commerce, war, and statecraft, and not just in
marriage, inheritance, and family. The question of what shari'a contains and its
interpretation is another matter entirely, and it has been common for local custom to be
legitimized via some grounding in shari 'a. See ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA'IM, TOWARD AN
ISLAMIC REFORMATION: CIVIL LIBERTIES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 11
(1990).
23 The fact of customary practices often superseding the code was dealt with by
judges in a practical manner: if custom could be shown, it prevailed. JALAL, SELF AND
SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 17, at 152. Thus, after codification "the problem was not so much
discovering what Muhammadan Law was as much as discovering the extent to which it was
followed." Id. One example of this, as Jalal notes, is in the predominance of customary
practice among the tribes of the North West Frontier provinces, who are governed by their
own tribal laws. These were often determined by family, rather than by Islamic law of which
they had very little knowledge. The same was true for Punjabi Muslims who were more
likely to be governed by their own custom than by shari'a. Id. at 153. Take, for instance, the
Punjab Laws Act of 1872, which carves out agricultural property from the domain of
shari 'a. Id.
24 For instance, the British were aware that reforms that cut against Indian
sensibilities could result in strong resistance. Despite their willingness to "preserve" the
religious law of its subjects, the British began a set of legal reforms that imported into the
communitarian culture of India a liberal universalism that went against the grain of most
Indians. A series of enactments such as the Freedom of Religion Act that allowed a convert
from Hinduism to inherit family property, the Gains of Learning Act that allowed an
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because Hindu and Muslim laws in their entirety are considered sacred
regardless of whether or not they are actually followed, 5 the act of carving
out the personal laws as "religious" law-as opposed to the other, equally
religious parts, such as criminal law-was an important concession because
it preserved those areas of the law that were considered important to
identity.26 Second, and more importantly, because the British did not confer
the rights of citizenship to their subjects, personal laws increasingly became
a way to press for civil rights. One consequence of using personal law as
proxy for citizenship rights was the beginning of a slow transformation of
the Muslim populace, which had never before seen itself as a nation apart
from their Hindu compatriots, into a distinct interest group.28 Nevertheless,
there remained a tension between the liberal notions of nation that separated
Hindus and Muslims into separate peoples and the communitarian realities
of their interaction and interdependence. 29 Indeed, Muslims at the turn of
the century were far less likely to see themselves as part of an overall
Muslim nation with common interests dictated by religious affiliation. Their
politics were to a much greater extent determined by their local context than
by their religious affiliation.30
individual educated by the joint family to keep the fruits of education for himself, and the
Widow Remarriage Act, eroded the rights of the joint family and privileged individuals over
groups. See PARASHAR, supra note 17, at 71-72.
25 Id. at 63.
26 See generally JALAL, SELF AND SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 17, at 144.
27 See id. at 141.
28 Id. at 153. As Anderson notes:
Under the colonial state, the category of "Muslim," or often
"Muhammadan," took on a new fixity and certainty that had previously
been uncommon. In theory, each individual was linked to a state
enforced religious category. Identities that were syncretic, ambiguous, or
localised gained only limited legal recognition; for the most part,
litigants were forced to present themselves as "Muhammadan" or
"Hindu". Courts repeatedly faced the problem of accommodating the
diversity of social groups within these two categories.
Anderson, supra note 20, at 181-82.
29 See JALAL, SELF AND SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 17, at 153.
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With the advent of the nationalist movement that sought to rid India
of colonialism, the distinctions and the divide between Hindus and Muslims
sharpened. Early on, the moneyed classes of Muslims (particularly in
Bengal) called for unified representation of "Muslim" interests. 31 Part of the
reason for this increasing vociferousness was a reaction to the emerging
nationalist rhetoric of the Congress movement which categorized Indian
interests into majority and minority. 32 Moreover, there was a concerted shift
to exclude Muslims through a construction of "Indian" identity in a Hindu
mold, an unfortunate trend that has followed Muslims into the present.33
The pressure placed on the British to protect Muslim interests, such as they
were, resulted in the creation of separate electorates along communal lines
in the Government of India Act of 1909, more commonly known as the
Minto-Morley Reforms. 34 This watershed moment's significance cannot be
overstated. With separate electorates, Muslims became a legally-recognized
minority.35
The upshot of the creation of separate electorates was that Muslim
attempts to hedge against the majoritarian impulse in the nationalism of
Congress and to secure rights were seen as an assault against the majority
and as a departure from the umbrella of Indian identity. 36 However, amid
rising Hindu nationalism, the Muslim leadership perceived that the Hindu
majority's articulation of swaraj, meaning self-rule, with its heavy
emphasis on religious motifs, left them three choices: to leave their
homeland entirely for Muslim lands; to press for recognition as a separate
nation; or to assimilate and become "Hinduized., 37 The independence
movement's mainstream leadership was clear about their preference. They
3lId.
32 Ayesha Jalal, Exploding Communalism: The Politics of Muslim Identity in South
Asia, in NATIONALISM, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT: STATE AND POLITICS IN INDIA 76, 90-
95 (Sugata Bose & Ayesha Jalal eds., 1998) [hereinafter Jalal, Exploding Communalism].
33 See JALAL, SELF AND SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 17, at 258.
34 Id. at 160.
35 id.
36 Id. at 80-90.
37 See Jalal, Exploding Communalism, supra note 32, at 258. See also PARTHA
CHATrERJEE, NATIONALIST THOUGHT AND THE COLONIAL WORLD 74-75 (1986). Chatterjee
discusses the thought of Indian nationalist poet Bankimchandra Chattoapadhyay (1838-1894)
who believed that "the new national religion had to be 'based on a purified "Hindu" ideal."'
Id. at 75.
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wanted Muslims to commit wholeheartedly to the national movement and
give up any focus on lands beyond Indian borders.38
As the independence movement progressed, its leadership claimed
that Muslims had a divided loyalty, because their sacred lands lay outside of
India and because they belonged to a pan-Islamic community of Muslims
(the ummah). This was used as justification for reconstructing an
indigenous Indian-Muslim population, descended from converts and
intermarried settlers, into an alien Other.39 This racism will be addressed
more fully below in the discussion of the Hindu Right and failing
secularism. It is mentioned here to point out that the accretion of the Indian-
Muslim identity as something apart from the Hindu and even "Indian"
identity, as well as the development of Muslims into a minority, occurred
and was constructed by and through discourses of difference engaged in by
the British, the Hindus, and the Muslims. The common perception that
Muslims alone set themselves apart is an incomplete and inaccurate account
of the evolution of Indian-Muslim identity.
The First World War pitted Britain against the Muslim Ottoman
Empire-the center of the Islamic world at the time-and consequently
jeopardized Indian Muslims' cooperation with the British. 40 The question
became whether the loyalties of Muslims should lie with their co-
religionists or their colonial rulers. 41 There was no uniform response.
Certain Muslim factions chose to continue their support of the British as a
counterweight to a more threatening Hindu majority.42 Others concluded
that supporting the British would pit them against their fellow Muslims, and
chose to ally more closely with the Congress-led independence movement
even while supporting the Ottomans.43 This ecumenicalism was encouraged
by British atrocities such as the events in Punjab in 1919, when the colonial
government opened fire on peaceful protestors, killing many and
imprisoning many more on sedition charges.44
38 See Jalal, Exploding Communalism, supra note 32, at 96-97.
39 id.
40 See JALAL, SELF AND SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 17, at 196.
41 Id. at 200-03 (discussing the khilafat movement and the forging of Hindu-
Muslim unity in the anti-imperialist struggle).
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 As Jalal describes:
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Unfortunately, communal discourse had become too entrenched to
abandon by that time. With each side vilifying the other, the 1920s saw
increases in communal fractiousness as well as internecine, sectarian
fighting.45 However, the decade was not devoid of gains for Muslims. For
one, the Shariat Act was passed, ending courts' reliance upon and
codification of local custom where it contradicted the law of the shari'a.
46
While this may not have been a universally beneficial legal achievement for
Muslims, it was a further realization of the separation between Muslims and
Hindus along "national" lines that had begun earlier, empowering Muslims
to take ownership of their personal law instead of having it interpreted by
the British.
The late 1930s saw the further development of the idea of a Muslim
nation, which had hitherto been primarily a discursive tool of differentiation
rather than a reality. A variety of territorial schemes were entertained in
reaction to the Congress's increasing willingness to carve Muslims out of
power even in regions in which they were a majority. The various
schemes envisioned are beyond the scope of this Article; it suffices to say
that the frontrunner was a two-nation idea that envisioned a separate
Muslim territory.48 During this period, Muslim leaders continued to
Rumors that the raj was at an end and the bazaars open to plunder saw
villagers from the neighboring districts flocking to the city. Ignoring the
Seditious Meetings Act, announced in the early hours of the morning of
April 13, 1919, thousands gathered in Jallianwalla Bagh for a meeting to
condemn government repression. As many as 379 were brutally gunned
down and some 1200 injured when Brigadier General Dyer ordered his
troops to fire without forewarning the crowd. The atrocities in Amritsar
and Gujranwala, which was subjected to indiscriminate aerial bombing,
bolstered the Gandhian non-cooperation movement in the province.
Id. at 205.
45 Id. at 247-53 (discussing the fighting between Arya-samajists and Muslims and
among Muslims, especially against the Qadianis).
46 See PARASHAR, supra note 17, at 146-48 (discussing the Muslim Personal Law
(Shariat) Application Act, 1937).
47 See JALAL, SELF AND SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 17, at 388-400. For an overview
of the struggle between the All India Muslim League and the Congress Party to represent
Muslim interests in pre-partition India and the complicated problem of balancing provincial
interests with those of the "centre," see SUGATA BOSE & AYESHA JALAL, MODERN SOUTH
ASIA: HISTORY, CULTURE, POLITICAL ECONOMY 140-45 (2004).
48 In the 1940 meeting of the All India Muslim League in Lahore, the "Pakistan
Resolution" was passed calling for a partition of India to provide a "homeland" for India's
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demonstrate disunity, using religion to legitimate their own positions while
de-legitimating others.49 At the same time, Muslims failed to agree on the
finer points of what a separate state would actually look like.50 These
divisions notwithstanding, the exclusion of Muslims from cabinet posts
after their good showing in the 1945-46 central and provincial elections
helped create more of a consensus behind the notion of a separate territory,
a notion that was now supported by the British.5 '
The 1947 Partition of India was among the most traumatic moments
in the region's history.52 There is no doubt that much of the violence that
accompanied the transmigration of Muslims and Hindus from one state to
another was communal in nature53 -an animus that was neither born at the
moment of partition nor unaided by a number of parties. Religious
difference as cultural difference had been deployed by the British to
enumerate and classify its subject population.54 The institution of separate
electorates along religious lines and the codification of personal laws-
developments supported by upper-class Muslims-further solidified this
separation.5 5 Additionally, the nationalism of the Congress party, which
attempted to include all of the various minorities while both retaining the
rights of the majority and making clear use of a religious vernacular, further
consolidated the use of religion as a major marker of difference.56
Muslims. See C.H. PHILLIPS ET AL., THE EVOLUTION OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN, 1858 TO 1947:
SELECTED DOCUMENTS 354-55 (1962); PETER ROBB, A HISTORY OF INDIA 201 (2002).
49 See JALAL, SELF AND SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 17, at 247-53.
50 GOWHER RizVI, LINLITHGOW AND INDIA: A STUDY OF BRITISH POLICY AND THE
POLITICAL IMPASSE IN INDIA, 1936-43, 82-85 (1978).
51 See BOSE & JALAL, supra note 47, at 148.
521d. at 157.
53 Id. However, it is important to underscore here that the victims of this violence
were primarily women. As Jalal notes with irony, the first experience of citizenship in a state
for many women was tainted by rape, abduction, and murder. This theme of women's
victimization is picked up further on in this Article. It is mentioned here simply to show that
while there were communal tensions amongst Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims at the frontiers of
the new states, one group bore the brunt of that violence without regard to their religious
affiliation and as such there is a commonality among women in the subcontinent even if it is
a thin one. See JALAL, SELF AND SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 17, at 562.
54 See supra notes 17-30 and accompanying text.
55 id.
56 See supra notes 31-51 and accompanying text.
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B. Symbols of Honor, Symbols of Nation: Women, Identity, and the
Legacy of Violence
This Article's account of the separation of Muslims from the
"norm" of Indian identity has not been a gendered account. It focused more
on the discursive formation of a fantasy character or identity defined
singularly by Islamic affiliation rather than the story of any particular
Muslim or group of Muslims. Moreover, regardless of how important and
alluring the fantasy of a discrete Muslim was to the political players during
partition, the story of Muslim women is certainly not adequately told by
such politically focused histories; indeed, such histories preserve the silence
surrounding the ways in which partition violence and rhetoric was enacted
upon women's bodies.
Ritu Menon and Kamla Bhasin's study of women's experiences of
violence during partition provides an important corrective to traditional
histories of the period. Instead of concentrating on the aggregate
characteristics of the half million dead and twelve million displaced during
the partition of India, 7 they focus on the stories of the large number of
women who were abducted, those who were forced to convert, and the
thousands who were raped and killed.58 According to government estimates,
55,000 Muslim women were abducted into the Indian State and 33,000
Hindu and Sikh women were abducted into Pakistan.59
It is important to understand the ways in which poor Muslim
women have been made into symbols of honor by their community and
objects through which punishment can be visited upon that community by
hyper-patriarchal fundamentalist organizations. As Jalal notes, "[a]ll said
and done, the commonality of masculinity was thicker than the bond of
religion. There were men in all three communities who delighted in their
momentary sense of power over vulnerable women; such was the courage
of these citizens of newly independent states. ,60
Those women who survived the atrocities of partition and remained
on the "wrong side" of the border were subjected to the horror of being
57 Swarna Aiyar, "August Anarchy": The Partition Massacres in Punjab, 1947, 18
S. ASIA: J. S. ASIAN STUD. 13, 13 (1995).
58 RITU MENON & KAMLA BHASIN, BORDERS & BOUNDARIES: WOMEN IN INDIA'S
PARTrITION (1998). Unfortunately, they do not provide any insight with regard to gendered
violence committed against men during partition.
59 Id. at 70.
60 See JALAL, SELF AND SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 17, at 561.
[Vol. 17:1
(Mis)Appropriated Liberty
"repatriated" to their proper country long after their families had given them
up for dead or abandoned them, without regard to the fact that many had
chosen to stay with their abductors. 6' Abducted women from all three
communities were not universally welcomed home to their families and
communities of origin. Once returned, many were seen as polluted and
irreparably broken. The insistence of nationalist parties on either side that
the "property" that was "their" women be returned reduced women to
symbols of nationalism: "in the classic transposition, the woman's [body]
became the body of the Motherland (Woman-as-Nation) violated by the
marauding foreigner., 62 By extension, then, the boundaries of women
became the borders of the nation. Muslim women have played the role of
representatives of the Muslim nation and as such, during partition and after,
they have been targeted as an alien within the Motherland-a Muslim
woman is, therefore, never simply an Indian woman but the means of
procreation by the "foreign."
63
With the advent of independence, the new Indian state had to
contend with sizeable minorities that remained within its borders. Both the
majority and the minorities continued to use religion to define themselves
as they had been defined in the previous decades and to press for separate
rights based on religious difference.64
Three points from the foregoing discussion need to be underscored.
First, there is a tendency to lay the blame for the partition of India on
Muslims. The common perception is that either Muslims were manipulated
by the British into their separatism, or they saw themselves as so different
from other Indians that they could not share a homeland. In either case, a
consequent suspicion exists that Muslims who remain in India are disloyal
and always harbor a desire to escape to Pakistan. The prejudice of these
ideas continues to color the experience of Indian-Muslims. 65 The second
61 MENON & BHASIN, supra note 58, at 70, 90, 104-05.
62 Id. at 109; see also id. at 63-78.
63 See, e.g., Ram Puniyani, India: "Our" Women, "Their" Women: Communal
Ideology and Women, SOUTH ASIA CITIZENS WEB, Aug. 25, 2005, http://www.sacw.net/DC/
CommunalismCollection/ArticlesArchive/RamPuniyani 15082005.html.
64 See generally JALAL, SELF AND SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 17, at 558 (discussing
the violence of partition and the attacks on Muslims in Delhi).
65 An interesting commentary on the situation of Indian-Muslims has come from
the movie industry. In the film Anwar, a young Muslim man escaping from the tragedies of
his past takes refuge in an abandoned temple. A young boy, seeing him pray, reports him as
a terrorist to the local Hindu nationalist party. The matter then escalates into a full-scale
gathering of Hindu fundamentalists shouting nationalist slogans and threatening Anwar with
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point is that, for traditional Indian-Muslims, the Muslim Personal Law has
become a key symbolic element of identity and an important political right
which is guarded vigorously whenever attempts at reform are made. The
third is that women, as bearers of community honor and identity, occupy a
specific space within religious communities, defined by identity politics and
the violence of partition. This means that at present, communal violence
against women is a continuing threat, following these same patterns.
1. After Independence: Secularism, the Constitution, and Religious
Identity
An examination of the historical context and operation of Indian
secularism is required in order to understand the UCC/Personal Law debate.
India's approach to secularism underscores the tension between group life
and rights and individual rights. Additionally, because of Indian
secularism's willingness to accommodate religion in the public sphere, it
permits religion and religious racism to seep into the public secular domain
and erode secular institutions. This latter point is addressed further in the
section on the UCC below. This section traces the tension between groups
and individuals and briefly touches on how even secular laws in India have
66some religious content.
India is a country with plural traditions, histories, religions, and
languages all vying for recognition and respect.67 Religion plays a
particularly important role in the everyday public and private lives of most
death. In a particularly interesting scene, the police bring the Muslim priest of the
community to speak to the suspected terrorist. The Imam, or priest, tells Anwar that all the
Muslims have hidden in their homes. If he harms anyone or the temple, it will be their death.
His best course is to stay in the temple and kill himself, or the community will be
slaughtered. In any event, he advises Anwar that he will not survive. In another scene,
Anwar's Hindu friend Udit asks him why Muslims consider themselves different and Anwar
replies that India failed to deliver on the promise of equality to Muslims and that every
Muslim in India is considered a terrorist after 9/11. This is a peculiar and interesting
statement reflecting how acts done by Muslims in any quarter of the world can turn into an
indictment of Indian-Muslims. ANWAR (Dayal Creations 2006), trailer available at
http://www.indiaglitz.com/channelsfhindi/trailer/8897.html.
66 It can be argued that all secular laws derive from earlier religion-based morality
and norms, and as such they are all "tainted." However, this Article argues that, specifically
with regard to family law, there is a bias towards Indian "native" religions, which is
demonstrated in anti-conversion provisions. See infra notes 197-208 and accompanying text
discussing the Special Marriage Act, 1954.
67 See SHASHI THAROOR, INDIA: FROM MIDNIGHT TO MILLENNIUM 7-13 (1997).
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Indians.68 The framers of India's Constitution had to take this central role of
religion into consideration when settling the matter of how secularism
would operate in the newly independent state. 69 Given the political role that
religious identity had played in the decades before independence, it was
clear that assimilative secularism that places religion in the private sphere,
as in the American model, would not have had much appeal, let alone
probability of success. 70 Rather, the framers sought to accommodate
religions equally. In other words, instead of attempting a neutral position
towards religion in general, India adopted neutrality among the various
religions. 71 The sensitivity towards religion is demonstrated by the fact that,
in spite of secularism's importance to the framers of the Constitution, they
declined to put it into the Constitution itself. As one prominent member of
the constituent assembly remarked:
The omission of the term "Secular" or "Secularism" is not
accidental but was deliberate. It seems-that the Constitution
Makers were apprehensive that, if the words "Secular" and
"Secularism" were used in suitable places in the Constitution,
they might unnecessarily introduce by implication the anti-
religious overtones associated with the doctrine of secularism as
it had developed in Christian countries. 7
2
Unfortunately, such solicitude towards religion has meant that the Indian
courts have continued in the British vein of adjudicating religious personal
laws, which often require them to interpret religious scripture and norms.
73
Furthermore, there is no bar to the state's promulgation of reform within the
religious laws.74 India's ameliorative secularism thus allows for and
68 See GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN, THE WHEEL OF THE LAW: INDIA'S SECULARISM IN
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 92 (2003).
69 See id. at 91-121.
70 See id at 92.
71 R.L. CHAUDHARI, THE CONCEPT OF SECULARISM IN INDIAN CONSTITUTION 90-91
(1987).
72 Id. at 94 (citing P.B GAJENDRAGADKAR, SECULARISM AND THE CONSTITUTION OF
INDIA 52 (1971)).
73 See JACOBSOHN, supra note 68, at 97-102 (discussing judges determining the
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regulates religions in the public domain, attempts to balance the need for
social reform against the rights of groups to retain or maintain their group
identity, and works towards gradual social change and uniformity. 75 Such
balancing has resulted in a built-in tension between accommodation of
religious groups and the emancipation of the individual, which is also
guaranteed in the Constitution.
On the one hand, for the protection of individual liberties, the
Constitution includes a section akin to the United States' Bill of Rights that
guarantees fundamental rights to the Indian people. Article 13 voids all laws
in force before the enactment of the Constitution that are inconsistent with
the fundamental rights to the extent of the inconsistency.76 Articles 14 and
15 guarantee equality and non-discrimination on the basis of religion, race,
caste, sex, or place of birth, but reserve the right of the state to make special
provisions with regard to women, children, and the "backward classes. 77
Article 25 guarantees the freedom of religion while reserving the rights of
the state to regulate secular activities associated with religious practice and
to provide for social welfare and reform.78 For group protection, on the
other hand, Article 26 guarantees every religious denomination the right to
manage its own affairs with regard to religion.7 9 And Article 29 guarantees
citizens the right to conserve their distinct culture.80
Although groups are allowed to govern themselves internally, the
Constitution makes it clear that the goal is to eventually unify the Indian
"nation." Article 44-a non-justiciable hortatory provision--directs the
state to endeavor to pass a uniform civil code that would trump all the
religious personal laws throughout the territories of India.8 1 Article 246,
read in conjunction with List III, Entry 5 of the Seventh Schedule,
75 Id
76 See INDIA CONST. art. 13, § 1, available at http://lawmin.nic.in/coi.htm.
" Id. art. 14-15. "Backward classes" refers to underrepresented ethnic and
religious minorities who face social and economic discrimination but are not defined in the
Indian Constitution as Schedule Castes or Schedule Tribes. See Government of India,
National Commission for Backward Classes, http://ncbc.nic.in/html/creamylayer.htm (last
visited Jan. 14, 2008).
78 INDIA CONST. art. 25, available at http://lawmin.nic.in/coi.htm.
79 d. art. 26.
0 Id. art. 29.
8 Id. art. 44.
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empowers Parliament and states to make laws that, before the enactment of
the Constitution, were categorized as personal law and therefore outside of
the domain of the legislature.82 And Article 372 declares that "all laws in
force in the pre-Constitution period shall remain in force unless lawfully
altered, repealed, amended [or adapted] by a competent authority. '83 As
Tahir Mahmood has argued, the above provisions
can be condensed into the following three basic postulates:
1. That each of the personal laws in force till the end of the
pre-Constitution era shall continue to apply unless the
State considers it advisable [as part of its function to set
up social order based on social justice, or otherwise] to
repeal, modify or replace it.
II. That henceforth all laws enacted in the area of personal
law must conform to the provisions of part III of the
Constitution dealing with Fundamental Rights.
III. That the State shall gradually lead the nation on a
voyage of progressive uniformity in the area of civil
laws.
8 4
Unfortunately, the provisions conflict with each other. There is
clearly no way to reconcile the Constitution's fundamental rights of
individuals with the pre-constitutional personal laws that do discriminate
(particularly against women), and which have been given a constitutional
pass until a "competent authority" can reform the law in conformity with
Article 13.85 This conflict has been resolved by a judicial interpretation that
82 See TAHIR MAHMOOD, PERSONAL LAWS IN CRISIS 6 (1986). Article 246 (2)
states: "Notwithstanding anything in clause (3), Parliament, and subject to clause (1), the
Legislature of any state also, have power to make laws with respect to any matters
enumerated in List III in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the
"Concurrent List")." INDIA CONST. art. 246(2), available at http://lawmin.nic.in/coi.htm. List
III of the Seventh Schedule, Entry 5 is comprised of "marriage and divorce; infants and
minors; adoptions; wills; intestacy and succession; joint family and partition; all matters in
respect of which parties in judicial proceedings were immediately before the commencement
of this Constitution subject to their personal law." INDIA CONST. list III, available at
http://lawmin.nic.in/coi.htm.
83 See MAHMOOD, supra note 82, at 144.
84 d. at 6.
85 Id. at 15.
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allows personal law to trump fundamental rights.86 In Bombay v. Narasu
Appa Mali, the Supreme Court carved out statutory personal laws such as
the Hindu code and the Muslim personal laws from the purview of Part III
of the Constitution.87 This exception has yet to be overturned. Indeed, there
has been a trend in the courts to protect group norms such as caste
classifications, discrimination against women, and discrimination against
non-marital children against Part III's fundamental rights guarantees.88
These provisions in the Indian Constitution indicate the delicate balancing
of individual rights and the desire for a secular political system against the
reality of a plural, religious society.
It is clear that the framers of the Constitution meant for there to be
continuity between the pre- and post-Constitution eras, allowing the various
religious communities to have their own religious Personal Law (Article
372), while giving the State the concurrent authority to enact laws in that
area. They ensured that the ability of the State to enact social reform
measures was not constitutionally subsumed under the duty to protect
India's religious communities. Ultimately, the aspiration was to pass a
uniform civil code that would apply to every citizen, but political
considerations mandated that the British plural system remain in effect in
the interim.
89
This is not to say that there has been no progress towards
secularization of family law. In the years after the enactment of the
Constitution, in one of the first attempts to create a secular family law
system, the state took steps to pass an amended Special Marriage Act of
1872. The Special Marriage Act of 1954 (SMA 1954) is an opt-in provision
for those who wish their marriage to be governed by secular laws. The
SMA 1954 goes further than the religious laws in providing women with
equitable family law rights. For instance, under the secular law, women are
allowed to sue for divorce, there is a provision for divorce by mutual
consent, the court may award women maintenance or alimony for their
lifetime if necessary, and plural marriages are prohibited. 90 However, the
861d. at 16-19.
87 Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali, A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 84 (India).
88 Id. See also, e.g., Susanne Hoeber Rudolph & Lloyd I. Rudolph, Living with
Difference in India: Legal Pluralism and Legal Universalism in Historical Context, in
RELIGION AND PERSONAL LAW IN SECULAR INDIA: A CALL TO JUDGMENT 36 (Gerald James
Larson ed., 2001).
89 Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali, A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 84 (India).
90 KUMUD DESAI, INDIAN LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 21-28 (1978).
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SMA 1954 incorporates certain discriminatory provisions of the Hindu
Code. 91
Unlike the Muslim code which has not been revised since the
British promulgation,92 a new Hindu Code was enacted in several stages in
the post-independence decade. 93 However, this iteration of the Hindu Code
continues to enshrine several anti-conversion provisions, and the SMA 1954
adopts these.94 Specifically, according to Section 21 of the SMA 1954,
Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, and Jains who are not in a mixed marriage-that
is, both partners belong to one of these faiths-are allowed to retain their
inheritance laws. However, if it is a mixed marriage or the partners are
Muslims or Christians, they are defaulted into the Indian Succession Act of
1925. While the Succession Act, which is based on British law, may be
more equitable towards women than the religious laws, the point here is that
the exemption for "indigenous" religious groups indicates a serious bias in
India's secularism that goes beyond neutrality among religions to favoritism
of the majority.
India's secularism, based on the ancient maxim sarva dharma
sambhava or "all religions are equal," purports to accommodate religious
groups equally. However, the constitutional provisions that guarantee
individuals equal protection come into conflict with clearly discriminatory
personal laws, which have acquired a judicial exemption from the
requirements of Articles 13, 14, and 15 of the Indian Constitution. This
conflict could be eliminated if personal laws of all groups could be
reformed. But the rise of the Hindu Right, its significant power even as the
opposition party, and its use of secular institutions while in power in the
1990s, have bred distrust and severely compromised the state's ability to
91 See MAHMOOD, supra note 82, at 26-28.
92 PARASHAR, supra note 17, at 159; See also JALAL, SELF AND SOVEREIGNTY,
supra note 17, at 140-45.
93 See PARASHAR, supra note 17, at 79-81. Interestingly, there have been several
revisions of Hindu law under the British as well as after independence. Before these
revisions, Hindu widows were not allowed to remarry, but Muslim widows were. Hindu
women were not allowed to inherit, but Muslim women were. Polygamy was practiced by
men of both religions. It is arguable, thus, that at least historically, Hindu women have
reaped some benefits from the "Islamization" of Hindu law.
94 See MAHMOOD, supra note 82, at 23-26. For example, the conversion of one
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maintain the balance between group identity and individual liberty.95
Moreover, the discourse of Hindutva that conflates Indian identity with the
dominance of Hinduism has inevitably inspired backlash from Muslim
hardliners, and as a result has made any attempts at personal law reform
through judicial decision-making nearly impossible.96
II. THE MUSLIM PERSONAL LAW: BLACK LETTER LAW AND
CUSTOMARY PRACTICE
In a recent article by a prominent Western legal scholar, Muslim
Personal Law was characterized in the following manner:
Muslim personal laws require a Muslim wife to be monogamous,
while a husband can have up to four wives. They also allow
husbands but not wives to divorce unilaterally without fault,
institutionalize dower arrangements that arguably amount to
selling women in marriage, grant male heirs twice the share of
female heirs, and do not allow mothers to be guardians of minor
children.
97
Historically, there has been a considerable gap between customary practice
and the black letter of the law that emerged from the process of
codification. Muslim practices still diverge significantly from the code and
are occasionally mistaken for "the law," or conversely "the law" is taken as
a reflection of common practice, as in the understanding of dower
arrangements cited above.
While this Article does not dispute the basic observation that
Muslim Personal Law treats women unequally, it argues that a more
nuanced approach is necessary. Practices vary regionally and by class;
generalizations that rely solely on the formal law, as those made above, are
difficult to maintain. Certainly, many Muslims would consider the
perspective of the Western legal scholar quoted above as a charged and
perhaps unfair interpretation that oversimplifies a rather complex
arrangement of family relations. It certainly merits some scrutiny and
interrogation.
95 See JACOBSOHN, supra note 68, at 109-10.
96 Id.
97 Catherine A. MacKinnon, Sex Equality Under the Constitution of India:




In order to foster a more complete and nuanced understanding of
the laws and customs that impact Muslim women, this section outlines the
formal law in four areas regarding Muslim marriage that have been
flashpoints for debate and the site of contests for rights. The first subsection
below describes the Muslim Personal Law, particularly after the Shah Bano
decision, in three family law areas: dowry, divorce, and maintenance. The
second subsection briefly discusses the laws with regard to polygamy-a
practice which the Hindu Right, the secular, liberal feminists, and many
Muslim women agree should be abolished. Where relevant, divergence
between formal law and actual practice is noted.98
By outlining the law in such detail, this Article departs from the
traditional treatment of Muslim Personal Law by scholars publishing in the
United States, who generally take the position that all the laws are unjust to
women because they are formally unequal.99 It also departs from the
dominant discourse in India that has taken the oppressiveness of Muslim
family law as axiomatic. Avoiding the temptation to make conclusory
statements assuming injustice and bias, this Article seeks to demonstrate
that there are areas of the law that, though unequal, are actually meant to
benefit women. Additionally, this exploration of the Muslim Personal Law
lays the groundwork for the argument that there is at least one area of
Muslim Personal Law that is progressive and should be retained and other
areas that are amenable to reform in a manner that could substantially better
women's rights without losing the law's "Islamic" quality.
A. Dower, Divorce, and Maintenance
It has been said by some scholars that Muslim marriages are
essentially contractual in nature. There is offer, acceptance, and
consideration. 00 Yet, it would be a mistake to reduce marriage to such a
mere contractual formality similar to a contract for services or goods.
Marriage is considered a sacred institution that all able Muslims are
enjoined to enter.' 0 ' It is of central significance in the ordering of group life
98 See MAHMOOD, supra note 82, at 49-94 (discussing the misinterpretation of
various provisions).
99 See, e.g., supra notes 9 and 17 and accompanying text.
100 M. A. QURESHI, MUSLIM LAW OF MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND MAINTENANCE 95
(1995).
101 See MAHMOOD, supra note 82, at 63-66.
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and, consequently, gender relations. 0 2 Moreover, Muslim marriage laws
reflect a traditional understanding of how partners in a marriage relate to
each other and outline a set of duties and rights for each partner.'0 3 These
duties and rights begin at the very onset of marriage through the
requirement of mahr, or consideration that must be given or promised
before a marriage can be solemnized.
10 4
Mahr (dower) is money or property given to the bride by the groom
as part of the solemnization of marriage. The value of the property or the
money may be any amount not less than ten dirhams 10 5 The amount may be
fixed before the marriage, at the ceremony, or after the ceremony.10 6 The
money that is given as mahr is payable to the wife and becomes her sole
property, as opposed to family property or the property of her father or her
husband after a second marriage.107 She is entitled to the whole amount
after consummation of the marriage or upon the death of her husband and
where "a claim is made for an amount named in a contract of dower the
court will award the full amount provided in the contract." 10 8 If she divorces
her husband before consummation, she is entitled to half of the dower.109 If
her husband dies without paying the mahr, it must be paid out of his estate
before his heirs can inherit and upon his wife's death, the mahr is payable
to her heirs.' 0
102 See DESAI, supra note 90, at 129-30. Note that for the Muslims who marry non-
Muslims (or, for Muslim men, outside the Abrahamic faiths) that marriage is not void ab
initio but irregular. Id. But c.f Narain, supra note 9, at 52 (stating that for Muslim men
interfaith marriages are permitted but not encouraged, while for women they are void ab
initio).
103 See MAHMOOD, supra note 82, at 63-66.
'o Id. at 66-68.
105 See DESAI, supra note 90, at 134. The dirham, currently the currency in only a
few Muslim countries, was for several centuries used as an Arab and Muslim currency in
various communities around the Middle East, Mediterranean, and South and Central Asia,
although India as a whole had the rupee as its currency.
106 Id.
107 See MAHMOOD, supra note 82, at 63-67.
108 DESAI, supra note 90, at 134-35.
110 See QURESHI, supra note 100, at 133-37. Unfortunately the Indian courts have
held that the dower debt is pari passu with other debts and the wife is not first among
creditors if a husband dies with other debts. Id.
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The Indian codification of Muslim law allows for several ways of
arranging the payment of mahr, among which the families choose at the
time that the mahr is negotiated. The mahr may be paid in part at the time
of marriage with the remainder due at a later time.1 1' It can also be paid in
full either at the time of marriage or at a later date. If the mahr is not fixed
at the time of marriage and there is a dispute as to the amount, the wife gets
an amount determined by custom and reasonableness. 12 In any event, there
is a minimum amount of required mahr without which a marriage cannot be
valid. However, according to case law, a wife in her majority can remit or
renounce her dower.'
13
Similar to any other debt, non-payment of the mahr allows the wife
several avenues by which she may enforce her rights. She may refuse to
cohabit with the husband or enter into the husband's household if the
marriage has not already been consummated.' 14 She may also refuse to
engage in intercourse until the mahr is paid.' 15 Nonpayment of dower is a
bar to any suit by the husband for restitution of conjugal rights.1 6 If the
marriage has been consummated, the court may award restitution of
conjugal rights conditioned upon the payment of the dower." 17 The Muslim
wife, therefore, has a viable cause of action to recover her debt while her
husband is alive. If her husband has died before paying the mahr, the
widow can also exercise a kind of widow's lien on his property."
18
In general, mahr's purpose is to ensure that a wife is provided for
independently, even though after marriage she has the right to proper
maintenance and support from her husband. 19 In other words, she may save
her entire dower and bequest it to her heirs or dispose of it at will without
affecting her right to be supported by her husband. One might consider such
a contract one of the first forms of pre-marital agreement, a type of contract
111 See DESAI, supra note 90, at 135.
112 id
113 See QURESHI, supra note 100, at 126-28.




"' Id. at 135.
119 See MAHMOOD, supra note 82, at 66-71.
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that has only recently become common in the United States.120 Mahr is
negotiated in a similar way to American pre-nuptial agreements, but with
the wife's father or male guardian acting in her interest, rather than a
lawyer. In the event of divorce, she is bound by the bargain made on her
behalf. Whether a father or guardian can be counted on to make a good
bargain and whether that bargain reflects the wife's wishes is beyond the
scope of this Article, but is a subject worthy of separate treatment. That
aside, mahr agreements provide the wife with a hedge against the risk of
destitution upon dissolution of her marriage or death of her spouse. 2 1 Thus,
in the absence of an adequate welfare system, mahr distributes important
religiously- and legally-sanctioned financial means for Muslim women.
Mahr agreements could also be construed as a disincentive (for
men) to divorce, addressing a perennial problem for Muslim women. In
Islamic law, the area of divorce has been the subject of many disputes
between the sexes. It has been argued that in the time of the Prophet,
Muslim women had the right to contract their own marriages and to divorce
on "reasonable grounds."'1 22 Unfortunately, over the past millennium,
women's access to divorce has been eroded, while the right of men to
divorce at will has been greatly augmented. 123 This disparity in ability to
divorce has generated a significant need for reform to secure equality for
Muslim women.
Classically, Islamic law allows several kinds of action by which
divorce can be obtained. First, talaq is divorce that is initiated by the
120 RANDY FRANCES KANDEL, FAMILY LAW: ESSENTIAL TERMS AND CONCEPTS 73
(2000).
121 KHAN NOOR EPHROZ, WOMEN AND LAW: MUSLIM PERSONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE
166-73 (2003) (citing the Lahore High Court holding that mahr was "not exchange or
consideration, as understood in technical sense in the Contract Act... but ... as a token of
respect, for its subject, the woman"). According to Ephroz's impact analysis surveying
educated women and housewives, housewives considered mahr as a security and a check to
unilateral divorce versus educated women who tended to view it as a sign of respect and a
check to unilateral divorce (approximately half of educated women saw it as such). Id. at
176-77.
122 See QURESHI, supra note 100, at 187-88. It should be noted that reasonable
grounds include incompatibility, lack of maintenance, cruelty, and withholding of sexual
intercourse.
123 Divorce was considered a last resort in Islam during the first millennium even
while it was recognized as a necessary evil. Before parties could divorce, there had to be a
good faith attempt at arbitration by both families to bring the parties together. Only when the
couple was irreconcilable or there was a defect that could not be overcome (such as
impotency or insanity), divorce was granted. See EPHROZ, supra note 12 1, at 220.
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husband at will, without any cause. It can be revocable or irrevocable, done
through written or oral pronouncement, and does not require the wife's
presence. A revocable talaq becomes irrevocable upon the passing of the
iddat, a period of time during which it is ascertained whether the wife is
pregnant with a child from the marriage.1 24 Second, a wife can initiate or
obtain divorce through khul, or mutual consent, in which she agrees to give
the husband consideration for dissolution of the marriage.1 25 Similar to the
marriage contract, the arrangements of khul are negotiated by the families
of the husband and the wife at the outset of the marriage. A wife may also
negotiate the right to divorce under certain conditions as part of her
agreement to marry and the husband may also confer such a right of his
own accord.12 6 "It is lawful for a Muslim husband to delegate to his wife
power to divorce on certain conditions or in specific contingencies. The
husband marrying a second wife is such a condition."'' 27 The exercise of
such a right would act as an irrevocable divorce. Finally, where both parties
seek dissolution, the mubara 'at form of divorce can be used. 128 This form of
dissolution may be initiated by either the wife or the husband, but for it to
take effect, both parties must agree to divorce.
Women's right to divorce unilaterally is codified in the Dissolution
of Muslim Marriages Act, VIII of 1939. The Act gives Muslim women the
right to divorce under nine conditions. A Muslim woman may divorce her
husband if:
1. his whereabouts have not been known for a period of
four years;
2. he has failed to provide maintenance for her for a period
of two years (for which she may sue him even if she is
able to maintain herself);
3. he has been imprisoned or sentenced to be imprisoned
for more than seven years;
124 See QURESHI, supra note 100, at 205-08.
121 Id. at 226-28
121 Id. at 254-55.
127 Id. at 260.
128 Id. at 233-34.
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4. he has failed to perform his marital obligations for a
period of three years;
5. he was impotent at the time of marriage and continues to
be so;
6. he has been insane for a period of two years, or suffers
from leprosy or a virulent venereal disease;
7. the wife was given in marriage by her father or guardian
before the age of fifteen and repudiates the marriage
before the age of eighteen;
8. he treats her with cruelty, that is, either physical or
mental, associates with women of ill-repute, attempts to
force her to lead an immoral life, disposes of her
property and refuses to allow her to exercise her legal
rights over it, obstructs her ability to perform her
religion, or has more than one wife and does not treat
her equitably; and
9. she has any other grounds which are recognized as valid
for dissolution under Muslim law.
129
Upon divorce, a Muslim woman has the right to maintenance
during her three month iddat period, until the time when she receives notice
of divorce, if any notice is given.1 30 After that time, her family resumes the
responsibility to maintain her.131 Thus, the objective of maintenance is not
to compel the ex-husband to provide for the divorced wife, as in the
Western concept of alimony.1 32 Rather, because Islam considers marriage to
be a union that can be dissolved, rather than an eternal bond, a woman is
never considered a part of her husband's family to the exclusion of her own
paternal family.133 She is not half of a couple, but rather a fully cognizable
129 Id. at 263-83. See also The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, No. 8 of
1939, available at http://indiacode.nic.in/rspaging.asp?tfnm= 193908.
130 QURESHI, supra note 100, at 366-67; Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on
Divorce) Act of 1986, available at http://www.indialaws.info/search/acts/?c9106177-abc7-
43e2-b33a-9c02e52c 14fb.
131 See MAHMOOD, supra note 82, at 68, 87.
133 Id.
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legal personality with independent rights who is capable of remarriage. 134 In
fact, remarriage is encouraged in Islam and is the underlying rationale
behind the short alimony period provided after divorce. 135 The passing of
three months ensures that the wife is not pregnant. If she is pregnant,
however, her husband is responsible for the child's maintenance until it
reaches majority and all children from the marriage, in turn, "belong" to
their paternal family. 
136
Prior to the Shah Bano case, discussed below in Part III, and the
passage of The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act of
1986 (MWA 1986), divorced Muslim women who were inadequately
supported and rendered destitute could sue under Section 125 of the Indian
Criminal Procedure Code for long-term maintenance beyond the iddat
period. Section 125 applied to all women regardless of religious affiliation.
However, for Muslim women, the passage of the MWA 1986, which
provided support to those who had contracted for insufficient mahr in event
of divorce, closed that avenue of legal recourse. Under the MWA 1986,
maintenance to ex-wives terminates after three months, regardless of
individual circumstances. 137
B. Polygamy
Polygamy has been a source of ongoing conflict both within the
Muslim community and between Muslims and other communities in India.
Moreover, polygamy deserves significant consideration in light of the fact
that it is held up as the ultimate evidence of Islamic law's injustice towards
women. Although some Muslim countries have either regulated or banned
polygamy, India continues to allow plural marriages for Muslim men,
though Muslim women are generally protected against criminal charges for
leaving their polygamous husbands.1
38
134 Id. at 82-88.
135 id
136 See DESAI, supra note 90, at 156-57.
137 See Narain, supra note 9, at 43, 55.
138 See LAW AND RELIGION PROGRAM OF EMORY UNIVERSITY, ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW
GLOBAL SURVEY: INDIA, http://www.law.emory.edu/IFL/legaI/india.htm (last visited Oct. 15,
2006). The Survey notes that:
With regard to polygamy, the Criminal Procedure Code establishes that a
woman who refuses to live with her husband on just grounds will still be
entitled to maintenance and those just grounds, as defined in the Code,
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According to Tahir Mahmood, the practice of polygamy is legal
under Islam so long as each wife is treated co-equally. 139 It is impermissible
to marry a second wife as a "replacement" or to forsake a wife without
divorcing her.140 However, the reality of polygamy where it is practiced
rarely observes these constraints.
14 1
It should be noted here that polygamy as a practice is not
particularly widespread among Muslim communities in India. In fact, the
incidence of polygamy among Muslims is approximately 6%, which is the
same as the rate of polygamy among Indian Hindus. 142 Even so, the right to
plural marriage is possibly the most objectionable of formal legal rights
accorded to Muslim men at the expense of Muslim women. Given that it
has been restricted, if not formally abolished, in other Muslim countries, the
time has come for such antiquated rights to be changed in India.
143
include the contracting of a polygamous marriage by the husband, even
if the personal law applicable to the parties permits polygamy. This
proviso only actually applies to Muslims as polygamy has been
abolished for all other communities. In Itwari v. Asghari [A.I.R. 1960
All 684], a suit for the restitution of conjugal rights by a Muslim
husband against his first wife, the Allahabad Court stated that the onus
was on the husband to prove that his second marriage did not constitute
any insult or cruelty to the first wife. Although the Muslim husband has
the right to contract a polygamous marriage, the Court held that it does
not necessarily follow that the first wife should be forced to live with
him under threat of severe penalties after the husband has taken a second
wife. Even in the absence of proof of cruelty, the Court would not pass a
decree for restitution of conjugal rights if it appeared that it would be
unjust and inequitable to compel her to return to her husband under the
circumstances of the case.
Id.
139 See MAHMOOD, supra note 82, at 68-7 1.
140 Id.
141 See id. (arguing that polygamy is incorrectly practiced by Muslims).
142 See Flavia Agnes, Women, Marriage and the Subordination of Rights, in
SUBALTERN STUDIES XI: COMMUNITY, GENDER AND VIOLENCE 106, 130-31 (Partha Chatterjee
& Pradeep Jeganathan eds., 2000). Polygamy is a subject that elicits strong emotion among
women, particularly those who have no cultural reference for the practice.
143 For examples of Islamic family law codes that depart from classical laws, see
summaries of Bangladesh Family Laws, Tunisia Family Laws, and Indonesia Family Laws.
LAW & RELIGION PROGRAM OF EMORY UNIV., ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW GLOBAL SURVEY,
http://www.law.emory.edu/IFL/index2.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2006).
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The following section addresses the form of change that India's
personal law should take. The relevant question is: Can women's position
be ameliorated within the current legal regime? Or must Muslim Personal
Laws be eliminated in order to ensure equality?
Il. WOMAN, MUSLIM, INDIAN: IMPROVING RIGHTS IN THE
CONTEXT OF CONFLICTING ALLEGIANCES AND FAILING
SECULARISM
Muslim women's formal rights in the area of family law clearly
have not kept pace with those of women in other Indian communities or
other nations. The relevant section of the family law in question has not
been revised by the state since its enactment more than seventy years ago.
For several years, the call for reform has been growing. 44 These calls have
come from a number of different sources including secular Indian feminists,
Muslim women, and the Hindu Right. More recently, the "plight" of
Muslim women in India has even garnered the attention of some American
legal scholars.
145
This section examines the proposals for improving the status and
rights of Muslim women and discusses the assumptions and problems
inherent to these proposals. The solutions presented fall broadly into two
categories. First, there are those who propose the enactment of a uniform
civil code either as a replacement for the personal law or as an opt-in code.
Within this category, the two major proponents are the Hindu Right, which
challenges the "privileges" given to religious minorities and calls for their
immediate end through the promulgation of a uniform civil code, and
secular feminists, who, from a gender perspective, challenge the inequity of
religious personal laws.1 46 Since, as shall be discussed below, the Hindu
Right has no real concern for gender justice, its position is not examined in
any depth. Rather, this Article focuses on secular, liberal feminists who
have called for a move to a secular opt-in code.
144 See Narain, supra note 9 (discussing the discriminatory aspects of Muslim
Personal Law). See also Sripati, supra note 9, at 132 (arguing that a uniform civil code needs
to be passed in order to secure rights for Muslim women). These authors focus on Muslim
Personal Law without placing that law in broader context, giving the impression that the
other personal laws are not discriminatory and that Muslim women are the only Indian
women in need of liberation. This is a false impression.
145 See MacKinnon, supra note 97; see also MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 223-30 (2000).
146 See RAJESWARI SUNDER RAJAN, THE SCANDAL OF THE STATE: WOMEN, LAW AND
CITIZENSHIP IN POSTCOLONIAL INDIA 149-50 (2003).
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The second category comprises those who propose to leave the
personal law regime intact. Within this group, the main proponents are
traditionalists who consider the law immutable and perfect. They argue that
the laws as written are equitable, but that the application is improper, which
accounts for their unjust impact bn women.
The final part of this section offers an alternative solution to the
problem of Muslim women's rights, taking the view that the religious
personal laws are facially inadequate and are likely to always harbor formal
inequalities due to the societal and political realities of male privilege in
Muslim communities and in Indian society in general. 147 However, Muslim
Personal Law is neither immutable nor stagnant; it offers enough
interpretive flexibility to achieve the substantive gains in rights that Muslim
women deserve. There is potential for Muslim Personal Law reform, as an
alternative to a secular code or as a step towards ultimate uniformity. This
Article argues that reform supported by the state and undertaken by
progressive members of the community in partnership with secular
feminists and other groups interested in gender justice is the best option for
the immediate future.
A. A Secular Feminist Solution: An Opt-in Uniform Civil Code and the
Problems of Failing Secularism
As discussed above, Article 44 of the Indian Constitution, an
aspirational provision, directs the state to "endeavor to secure for the
citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India.' 48 The
purpose of this code is to universalize all family law and to eradicate the
dual secular-religious system. 149 However, as of this writing, the code
remains no closer to realization than when the Constitution was enacted.
Over the years, movement toward a uniform civil code has met sustained
resistance from conservative Muslims who take a communitarian/minority
rights position.150 This opposition became acute after the Shah Bano
decision, which led to hyper-politicization of the issue of women's rights
and of personal law in general. Minority rights supporters and
communitarians are concerned that a uniform civil code would essentially
147 Id. at 147-56.
148 INDIA CONST. art. 44, available at http://www.lawmin.nic.in/coi.htm.




universalize the majority Hindu law. In effect, they argue, such a move
would force the relinquishment of minority religious law and practice which
are central pillars of Muslim identity.15 1 In opposition, the calls for the
enactment of the code have become an unfortunate point of convergence for
secular feminists and Hindu fundamentalists who have vociferously called
for its immediate passage as "a means of removing the 'privileges' of
minority men."
'152
According to the Hindu Nationalist view, the Uniform Civil Code
would be a version of Hindu law, and would thereby secure Hindu
hegemony. 153 The Hindu Right's position makes Indian feminist positions
on the UCC particularly difficult. Although secular feminists have been the
only group to foreground gender in their critique, the very fact that they at
one time supported a mandatory UCC that supplanted personal laws puts
them into an uneasy and unavoidable alliance with the Hindu Right. In
order to distance themselves from the Right's majoritarianism, they have
had to take positions either in support of minority rights that conflict with
their feminist principles, or in favor of reforms that are in essence half-
measures. 154 Given that communities are often the primary sites of women's
subordination,15 5 feminists have had to contend with complex and deeply-
rooted conflicts between gender and religious affiliation: "This double
commitment ... lead[s] to acute dilemmas for feminist understanding and
to the paralysis of feminist praxis.' 56
Despite reaching a consensus on the inadequacies of religious laws,
the feminist movement has been less cohesive about what direction it ought
to pursue to improve gender rights. Nivedita Menon has summarized the
different goals promoted by factions within the feminist movement as the
following:
1. compulsory egalitarian civil code for all citizens
151 Id. See also SHAHIDA LATEEF, MUSLIM WOMEN IN INDIA: POLITICAL AND
PRIVATE REALITIES 198-99 (1990).
152 RAJAN, supra note 146.
153 Id. at 148-49.
1541d. at 151.
155 For a critique of community, see MIRANDA JOSEPH, AGAINST THE ROMANCE OF
COMMUNITY xviii-xxvi (2002); see also ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, No TURNING BACK: THE
HISTORY OF FEMINISM AND THE FUTURE OF WOMEN 8 (2002).
156 RAJAN, supra note 146, at 151.
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2. reforms from within communities without state
intervention
3. reform from within as well as legislation on areas
outside personal law
4. optional egalitarian civil code
5. reverse optionality where all citizens come under the
code's jurisdiction and can choose to opt out. 157
As the first of these positions has been co-opted by the Right, it has lost
support among most women's rights activists. The remaining options fall
into two camps. In the first camp are the communitarians who support the
second option of internal change; the second camp is comprised of various
feminist groups calling for legislative action, regardless of the reforms that
take place within the community. 158 The next section examines the
arguments for internal change, particularly those made by Muslim
traditionalists, in greater depth.
First, this Article considers the most enduring of the above
positions-that of an opt-in code. The opt-in solution calls for the
promulgation of a UCC that women can elect as the law governing their
marriage. This solution allows women an alternative, while not threatening
the traditional religious personal law regime. Most recently, the proposal for
an opt-in code has been revived by Catherine MacKinnon.1 59 In
MacKinnon's formulation, in contrast to the SMA 1954, a woman need not
elect the civil code in its entirety at the time of the marriage; a woman
might marry under her own personal law, but could then choose a civil code
"' See id. at 157-58.
158 See id.
159 See MacKinnon, supra note 97, at 199. MacKinnon proposes:
[O]ne possible way out of the legal and political thicket-a compromise
that faces the fact that many of these laws violate sex equality standards
but recognizes the judicial reluctance (however unprincipled) to
invalidate them--could be to enact a uniform code of family law
pursuant to Directive Principle 44 that provides for sex equality in all
respects between women and men on its face and in application, with its
use optional at a woman's discretion, including as relief for proven sex
inequality in a community's personal law.
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remedy in the event of litigation involving sex discrimination. Women are
given the choice of the secular and more favorable law, without threatening
the existence of the personal law as a whole.1 60 The benefit of such an
approach is that rather than having to choose between the secular law in its
entirety and personal law, it allows women to invoke the remedies of the
civil code at the time when she is most in need of an empowering option,
without invalidating the personal code. This is certainly a far more
politically expedient approach than a wholesale elimination of personal
laws.
However, MacKinnon's proposal rests on the same problematic
underlying assumptions that generally plague secular feminist solutions that
propose an optional code. First, these positions all depend on the crucial
assumption that the state is capable of producing a secular code that is fair
and neutral across all religions, and is capable of administering it
accordingly.161 To be able to enact a neutral code, the state itself must be
robustly secular and neutral in its institutions, while simultaneously
accommodating the vibrant religious life of Indians of all creeds. Second,
these positions assume that the state has the political will to enact and
enforce gender-equitable laws. Third, there is an assumption that formal
equality will improve Muslim women's lives. An examination of certain
provisions of SMA 1954 and the Hindu Code 2005 may be instructive as to
the limits of such legislation. These problems and this assumption are given
closer scrutiny below.
L The Assumption of a Robust Secularism
Secularism is an essential prerequisite to establishing the trust of
minority communities in the state. Without confidence in the neutrality of
the government, minorities, particularly Muslims who have faced
discrimination for decades, are unlikely to acquiesce to a surrender of their
160 Id. Though this proposal adds a layer of complexity to family law in India, it is
certainly more workable than the proposal to amend the Constitution that invalidates any
laws that conflict with the Articles that guarantee sex equality.
161 MacKinnon correctly notes that constitutionally, India has a guarantee of both
formal and substantive sex equality. However, the issue has never been one of constitutional
inadequacy but rather of jurisprudence. Indian courts, as she also acknowledges, have been
reluctant to enforce the constitutional guarantees in the area of family law. Yet, in addition to
the unwillingness to rule in favor of sex equality, there has been a strain of anti-Muslim
sentiment in personal law jurisprudence, not to mention a tendency to formulate secularism,
that favors the majority religion. This is taken up below. See infra notes 186-190 and
accompanying text.
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own laws. The religious laws have traditionally guaranteed at least some
measure of autonomy for the community within a sometimes hostile state.
Unfortunately in the Indian-Muslim experience, ameliorative and
accommodationist secularism has been no defense against an ideology that
seeks to assimilate or excise all differences through a discourse of equality
and neutrality. 162 In fact, because secular institutions have been co-opted by
the Hindu Right to promote Hindutva, Indian-Muslims have had some
cause for mistrust and concern.
6 3
For instance, in the Hindutva cases of the mid-1990s, the Indian
Supreme Court held that references by the Hindu Right to ideologies of
Hindu nationalism or Hindutva were not violations of Section 123(3) of the
Representation of the People Act of 1951 (RPA 1951) which bars appeals to
religion and communalism in attempts to gain votes. 64 Rather, Hindutva
was construed by the Courts as a general reference to Indian culture and a
"way of life., 165 Relying on two cases, Yagnapurushadji v. Vaishya166 and
Commissioner of Wealth Tax v. Sridharan,67 the Court concluded that it
could give no definition to Hinduism, Hindu, or Hindutva. It concluded that
the Hindutva is a synonym for Indianization and "the development of a
uniform culture by obliterating differences between all the cultures co-
existing in the country. 1 68 This construction delineates a boundary
excluding as aliens those who are not Hindu or legally-constructed Hindus
(Buddhists, Sikhs, and Jains).1 69 The Court found nothing troubling with
162 See Cossman & Kapur, supra note 12, at 114. The secularism of India is very
different from that of the United States. At the time of independence, there were two
competing philosophies. Nehruvian secularism was more in line with the liberal secularism
of the West while Gandhian secularism was based on pluralism and tolerance. There is no
concept of the complete separation of religion and politics with the former squarely placed in
the private sphere. Rather, India has chosen, for better or worse, to embrace its multiple
cultures and religions and take an active role in religion by administering religious law and
religious trusts and appointing religious personnel in some cases. See also RAJAN, supra note
146, at 151-56; FLAVIA AGNES, Law and Gender Inequality, in WOMEN & LAW IN INDIA 94-
106 (2004).
163 See RAJAN, supra note 146, at 151-56.
164 For a description of these cases, see JACOBSOHN, supra note 68, at 14-16.
165 Id.
166 Yagnapurushadji v. Vaishya, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 1119 (India).
167 Commissioner of Wealth Tax v. Sridharan 1976 S.C.R. 481 (India).
168 Prabhoo v. Kunte, (1996) 1 S.C.C. 130 (India).
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this definition that overtly demands the assimilation of Muslim religious
differences-the very differences that have, at least in discourse, since pre-
partition days become equivalent to a separate Muslim culture-by
equating Indian culture and Indian identity with Hinduism.
70
The Court went on to state that speech promoting Hindutva was
acceptable in the promotion of secularism and that it was an issue of fact
whether or not there had been a violation of the RPA 195 1.171 "The decision
was immediately claimed by the Hindu Right as a vindication of their vision
of Hindutva."'' 72 The Hindu Right's discourse of secularism and equality
has been unequivocal in its majoritarianism and its program to eliminate
"special treatment" of minorities. By equality, it means that everyone is
equally subject to Hindu norms. 73 By neutrality, it means that no group will
receive special treatment, obscuring the fact that the majority legislating
such "reform" would itself receive special treatment by virtue of being in
the position to codify its religious laws as every religious community's
law.17 4 Under these circumstances, liberal calls for uniformity and
secularism take on a sinister tone. Consider Gerald Doppelt's suggestion
with regard to minorities:
[A] robust liberalism would require that Indian people transform
these illiberal religious cultures and identities. A key step in this
process would be to abolish their group rights of civil self-
legislation, bringing all groups under a uniform secular law and
culture of equality and freedom in the civil sphere. Clearly, this is
a case where the law plays an essential role in transforming
illiberal cultures and identities .... 175
169 See Cossman & Kapur, supra note 12, at 116.
170 See supra notes 37-65 and accompanying text.
171 Prabhoo v. Kunte, (1996) 1 S.C.C. 130 (India).
172 See Cossman & Kapur, supra note 12, at 116.
173 Id.
174 See, e.g., Asghar Ali Engineer, Can India 'Shine' Under Hindutva?,
COUJNTERCURRENTS, Mar. 4, 2004, http://www.countercurrents.org/engineer04O3O4.htm.
175 See Gerald Doppelt, Illiberal Cultures and Group Rights: A Critique of
Multiculturalism in Kymlicka, Taylor, and Nussbaum, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 661,
681 (2002).
20081
Columbia Journal of Gender and Law
Read against the Hindu Right's program of Indianization and Bal
Thackeray's racist invective against Muslims, whom he compares to the
Jews of Europe, Doppelt's argument highlights the way in which liberalism
fails to account for the privilege of those doing the "equalizing" and the
costs of such assimilation. Bal Thackeray baldly states the position of the
majority Hindu Right who were so recently in power: "Have they behaved
like the Jews in Nazi Germany? If so, there is nothing wrong if they are
treated as Jews were in Germany."'' 76 Following the Bombay riots of the
1990s, his remarks reflected a similar hatred: "I want to teach Muslims a
lesson," and: "If they're going, let them go. If they are not going, kick them
out. ' 177 Moreover, the focus on women during the riots reveals the
particular space that women occupy:
Going a step further in the communal riots of 92-93 in Mumbai
and Surat and the Gujarat riots of 2002 Muslim women were
targeted in a horrific way. In all communal ideologies women are
regarded as the property of men and as the vehicle of community
honor. Rape is used as the weapon to humiliate the "other"
community. The rapists coming in Khaki shorts with saffron
underwears [sic] in Gujarat gave a message of sorts. The
communalized section of Hindu women helping "their" men in
committing of this heinous crime spoke volumes as to how the
perversions of communal ideology can influence the victims of
communal ideology, the women themselves. The other aspect,
which has got linked up with the communal ideology, is the
dangerous fertility of "others" and "their" women. The selective
targeting of women's reproductive organs in the Gujarat carnage
stared in our face telling the tale of the success of this propaganda
which subsists as the fodder that Muslims are increasing their
population. The fact that the relative rise in Muslim population
has nothing to do with religion, or that it has more do with the
poverty, illiteracy and social development does not have any
place in such thinking. In a sense when all these acts are being
perpetrated on the hapless victims it is regarded as a service to a
particular nation as the case may be, in this case, the Hindu
Nation! 178
176 See Cossman & Kapur, supra note 12, at 116-17.
177 See id.
178 Puniyani, supra note 63 (emphasis added).
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It strains reason to assume that a political system in which such ideologies
have substantial purchase, and in which parties espousing these ideologies
are elected to state and central government, could craft and legislate a
secular code that acts neutrally.
2. The Assumption of Political Will to Better Women's Status
Cossman and Kapur have argued persuasively that secular
institutions, such as the judiciary, have been co-opted by the Hindu Right. 79
Therefore, liberals, including liberal feminists, make dangerous
assumptions about the effects of a uniform civil code, particularly on
minorities, when they fail to examine how equality, neutrality, and
secularism are subject to ideological deployment by the Right in furtherance
of an assimilationist agenda.
Given the precariousness of Indian secularism and the continuing
force and appeal of Hindu Right ideology, the state's commitment to gender
justice and legal reform remains unclear. Two events, viewed in contrast
with one another, indicate a troubling picture of the state's political will
with regard to women's rights. First, the enactment of the Muslim Women
(Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act of 1986 shows the extent to which
women's rights are susceptible to political pressure and manipulation.80
The Act, which overturned the Shah Bano judgment, was passed by a
politically fearful Congress government under pressure from Muslim
conservatives. This is a prime example of how communal politics can serve
up gender justice on a platter if it furthers their other priorities.
Shah Bano, a seventy-three-year-old woman, was divorced by her
husband of forty years through the pronouncement of talaq and turned out
of her house.18' She sued for prolonged support from her husband beyond
her iddat period under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The
Supreme Court of India ruled in her favor, granting her continued
maintenance. In reaction, fundamentalists, both Hindu and Muslim,
mobilized a discourse of identity that threatened to unseat Congress, the
leading party, and to tear Indian society apart along communal lines.
182
Muslim conservatives pejoratively labeled Muslim progressives who fought
179 See Cossman & Kapur, supra note 12.
is0 See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
181 See Zakia Pathak & Rajeswari Sunder Rajan, Shahbano, in FEMINISTS
THEORIZE THE POLITICAL 261 (Judith Butler & Joan W. Scott eds., 1992).
182 Id.
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to uphold the verdict as "Westernized" or non-Muslim. I8 3 The incumbent
Congress government, fearing the loss of the Muslim vote and under
pressure from the All-India Muslim Personal Law Board and conservative
Muslims, passed the MWA 1986. The Act reversed the Court's prior
decision and foreclosed the right of Muslim women to sue for continued
maintenance beyond the iddat period.18 4 In the process, the reality of Shah
Bano's predicament was abstracted in such a manner as to occlude her
completely.18 5 The case became about the Muslim community's identity and
rights as opposed to a woman's right to receive maintenance after divorce.
The fact that Muslim women had sued and received maintenance under
Section 125 in the past raises the question as to why this particular case
became the flashpoint between Muslim fundamentalists and progressives as
well as between Hindu fundamentalists and Muslim fundamentalists.
Undoubtedly, one reason for the contentiousness is that the Court
engaged in an unnecessary Qur'anic exegesis to conclude that Shah Bano
deserved maintenance, where it could have easily decided the matter on
other grounds, such as public policy or the state's interest in ensuring
women were not rendered destitute.' 8 6 Instead, the Court chose to engage in
an ill-advised interpretation of Islamic law in a manner that shoehorned the
state's position on maintenance into an Islamic position. This move
inflamed Muslim conservatives at a time when their position in Indian
society was already threatened. 8 7 Moreover, the Chief Justice's comments
betrayed a prejudice against Muslims that made matters much worse:
[I]t is alleged that the "fatal point in Islam is the degradation of
woman." To the Prophet is ascribed the statement, hopefully
183 See, e.g., Pathak & Rajan, supra note 181, at 263.
184 See Vibhuti Patel, The Shah Bano Controversy and Challenges Faced by
Women's Movement in India, in PROBLEMS OF MUSLIM WOMEN IN INDIA 140 (Asghar Ali
Engineer ed., 1995).
185 See id.
186 See Fuzlunbi v. Vali, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1730 (India). But see Latifi v. Union of
India, A.I.R. 2001 S.C. 3958 (India). In interpreting The Muslim Women (Protection of
Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, the Court held that the Act would be unconstitutional if not
interpreted to mean that women would get a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance.
The Court stopped short of declaring the Act unconstitutional, but at least it did not base its
interpretation of the Act on theology, but on the Constitution. See Indira Jaising, All Unjust
Personal Laws Must Go, Be They Hindu, Muslim or Christian, COMMUNALISM COMBAT, July
2004, http://www.sabrang.com/cc/archive/2004/julyO4/cover7.html.
187 See Cossman & Kapur, supra note 12.
[Vol. 17:1
(Mis)Appropriated Liberty
wrongly that "Woman was made from a crooked rib, and if you
try to bend it straight, it will break; therefore, treat your wives
kindly." . . . It is too well known that "A Mahomedan may have
as many as four wives at the same time but not more."1
88
Muslim conservatives have been roundly excoriated for their role in
pressuring the Congress government to reverse the judgment favoring Shah
Bano, and rightly so. 189 However, the role of the judiciary in inciting such a
predictable reaction through their inflammatory dicta has been treated as
minor in comparison. 190 The dominant discourse interpreted these events in
a manner that cast Muslims as an overly sensitive community. An equally
plausible, yet downplayed, interpretation is that the judges acted in a
"racist" manner. This case underscores how communal politics-deployed
by both the minority community and the state, even in the halls of justice-
can have devastating effects on women. But Muslim women are not the
only ones who are vulnerable to this sort of manipulation. Hindu women are
similarly vulnerable, albeit for very different reasons.
The Bharitiya Janata Party (BJP), the Vishwa Hindu Parishad
(VHP), and the Rastriya Swayam Sevak (RSS), which comprise the Hindu
Right, supported the long-banned practice of sati, the immolation of
widows on their husbands' funeral pyres, when it reared its head once again
in the 1980s. The groups' support of the heinous practice belied their
support for women's rights as reflected in their call for the enactment of the
UCC.' 9' Indeed, the Right's agenda has troubling implications for women,
as became evident with the second illustrative event. In 1987, when Roop
Kanwar, an eighteen-year-old Rajasthani widow was burned on her
husband's funeral pyre, there was a dual public discourse of condemnation
and glorification of the act.' 92 Although the Congress government
188 Khan v. Begum, (1985) 2 S.C.C. 556 (India), reprinted in SHAH BANO AND THE
MUSLIM WOMEN ACT A DECADE ON: THE RIGHT OF THE DIVORCED MUSLIM WOMAN TO
MATAA, at 79 (Lucy Carroll ed., 1998), available at http://www.wluml.org/english/pubs/
pdf/misc/Shah-Bano-eng.pdf.
189 See Pathak & Rajan, supra note 181, at 259-60.
190 See PARASHAR, supra note 17, at 173-75; Jain, supra note 9, at 217; Narain,
supra note 9, at 55.
191 See, e.g., LESLIE J. CALMAN, TOWARD EMPOWERMENT: WOMEN AND MOVEMENT
POLITICS IN INDIA 162 (1992).
192 See Paul B. Courtright & Namita Goswami, Who Was Roop Kanwar?: Sati,
Law, Religion and Postcolonial Feminism, in RELIGION AND PERSONAL LAW IN SECULAR
INDIA: A CALL TO JUDGMENT 200 (Gerald James Larson ed., 2001).
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disavowed the practice, 300,000 people attended the chunri mahotsav, a
ritual that marks the thirteenth day after the sati.193 Prominent community
leaders attended, including representatives of the Rajasthan branch of the
BJP and its youth wing.194 Rather than decrying the living immolation of a
young woman, the Right glorified this as an act of piousness. The lack of
concern for the life of this Hindu woman, who may have been coerced by
her in-laws, as compared to the high-profile concern over the plight of Shah
Bano, highlights the disingenuousness of the right wing's co-optation of
women's rights in general.' 95 Whereas Shah Bano's case was used against
the Muslim community as a way of decrying the fate of Muslim women, the
discourse regarding Hindu women was not similarly tragic when it came to
Roop Kanwar.196 The former was seen as a symbol of the oppression of
Muslim women, whereas the latter was exalted as a symbol of the purity
and holiness of Hindu women. In fact, both women suffered at the hands of
a culture that subordinates women regardless of whether they are mourned
as victims or glorified as heroines.
Though it is possible that a just and neutral UCC may be
promulgated, the state's failing secularism and the lack of political will
make such a prospect bleak. Nevertheless, we can safely consider the
current laws as the floor to secularism and neutrality-assuming that they
are unlikely to become more discriminatory. By examining certain
provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955, which is more gender equal,
and the Special Marriage Act of 1954, one might find an indication of the
provisions that could be enacted in a secular code. They also reveal the
limits of formal rights in improving women's lives.
3. Limits of Formal Legal Rights: Lessons from the Special Marriage
Act of 1954
The secular law of marriage as codified by the Special Marriage
Act of 1954 allows all citizens to contract civil marriages. 197 However, for a
secular law, it reveals a pervasiveness of majoritarian privilege that has
caused minorities to be wary of a move to universalize personal laws. The
193 id.
194 id.
195 See Pathak & Rajan, supra note 181.
196 See id.
197 See DESAI, supra note 90, at 3-43.
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SMA 1954 is not a strictly neutral law; rather, it allows Hindus, Sikhs,
Buddhists, and Jains-religions of Indian origin that are constructed as
Hindu-to retain their personal law of succession on contracting a civil
marriage. 198 Conversely, one who contracts an inter-religious civil marriage,
or a Muslim, Christian, Parsi, or Jew-religions constructed as foreign-
who contracts a civil marriage, loses his or her personal law of succession
and is governed by the Indian Succession Act 1925.199 This means that
Hindus are able to inherit from their families under Hindu personal laws,
while others are defaulted into a "secular" law by contracting a marriage
under the same civil statute.200 In other words, Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs,
and Jains are permitted to remain part of a joint family structure so long as
they are married to an adherent of one of those religions. If they
"intermarry," they lose this privilege.01 Interestingly, such "inequality"
may actually benefit Muslim women who would otherwise be subject to a
discriminatory Muslim inheritance law.
Yet, to give the SMA 1954 and its framers credit, the Act has a
number of provisions that promise greater rights to women: it allows for a
judicial determination of custody based on a flexible best interest of the
child standard and awards maintenance according to need for as long as
deemed necessary, although an order of permanent alimony may be
rescinded if the wife is "not leading a chaste life. 202 Further, it prohibits
bigamy by anyone who chooses to marry under its provisions.2 3 Therefore,
a person may not choose to marry under the secular law and then decide
later to marry another under religious law. The SMA 1954 also liberalizes
divorce and allows women to dissolve a marriage on equal footing with
men.204 Similarly, according to the more egalitarian reformed Hindu
Marriage Act of 1955, men and women are both able to sue for divorce. In
addition, either partner can be liable for maintenance.20 5
198 Id. at 12-14.
199 See MAHMOOD, supra note 82, at 26-27.
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 DESAI, supra note 90, at 34.
203 Id. at 39-40.
204 Id. at 21-28.
20 5 Id. at 113.
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While the formal equality encoded in these provisions may seem to
be a progressive development, one that may be adopted in a new secular
code, the realities of Indian women's lives bespeak caution about their
effects. For instance, making both partners liable for maintenance may have
some perverse effects in a country where gender disparities abound, women
are abandoned to raise their children alone, and men often spend their
earnings on themselves instead of their families. 206 It is only too easy to
imagine a situation in which a husband loses or spends his income while a
working wife saves a modest amount in order to provide for her children.
Upon divorcing his wife, this husband could sue for maintenance from his
better-off wife. Moreover, none of her property would be sheltered from
him. Regardless of formal equality, such a law distributes income away
from women in a society where women are generally economically
vulnerable. In contrast, if administered as written in the code, Islamic law at
minimum shelters a wife's property from her husband and from her family.
Moreover, a husband may not sue for maintenance. 20 7 Fortunately, the
current SMA 1954 also disallows suits by husbands. While it is not gender
neutral, it is substantively more just.20 8
Other laws have similar negative distributive impacts as that of the
Hindu maintenance provision. The current law makes dowry illegal as it is
practiced by Hindus (and erroneously by some Muslims). 20 9 Moreover, the
Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961 allows for dowry to be paid to the wife, but
it is not a condition of a valid marriage. 210 Men can choose not to pay any
dowry at all.21' If the UCC were to have a similar provision, or a provision
that eliminated all dowries, it would eliminate a source of income and
security that Muslim women rely on for survival.21 2 Where women's
206 See, e.g., NUSSBAUM, supra note 145, at 113 (discussing the situation of
Jayamma); Amarnath Tewary, India's Feisty Untouchable Woman, BBC NEWS, Feb. 19,
2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south-asia/4723680.stm.
207 See DESAI, supra note 90, at 149-5 1.




212 It has been argued that the requirement of mahr has been heavily influenced by
the Hindu practice of bride-price or dowry; however, it should be noted that despite regional
variations, mahr remains an essential part of the marriage agreement in Islam. It is therefore
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economic position is insecure, the right to contract for and keep mahr out of
the reach of men may be the only financial security that a Muslim woman
has. It is certainly not guaranteed that her paternal family will support her or
that the Muslim religious trusts (Waq/) are solvent enough to provide for all
divorced women.21 3
Another area in which formal rights have had limited efficacy is
polygamy. As noted above, the SMA 1954 criminalizes plural marriages for
those who marry under its auspices, and Hindu law similarly prohibits
214polygamy for all Hindus. Yet, the rates of bigamy or polygamy in the
Muslim community are comparable to those of the Hindu community. In
both communities, about 6% of marriages are bigamous or polygamous.21 5
Formal abolishment of plural marriages has not made a perceptible
difference in the actual rates of such marriages. For Hindu women, the only
difference is that she may divorce her husband and he is punishable for his
conduct. But such disincentives have not been effective in preventing the
harm.
Finally, there are two further problems with the opt-in code that
deserve mention. One has to do with the maintenance of a private sphere in
which unjust religious laws can operate, and the other has to do with the
possibility of "free choice." An optional code, particularly one that requires
Muslim women to opt-in by entirely abandoning Muslim laws, preserves a
public/private dichotomy. By creating an equitable opt-in code in the public
realm, the state would allow Muslim traditionalists to retain their hegemony
in the private/religious realm. It would, moreover, give credence to their
claim that religious law is unchangeable and allow them to construct
religion and religious identity unchallenged. Such a development is
unacceptable because it fails to challenge patriarchal norms throughout
society, making a truly equitable ordering of gender relations impossible.
Furthermore, by reinforcing the public/private split, Muslim women
would still be presented with a choice between exit from the religion and
possibly the community or acquiescence to unjust patriarchal constructions
of religious law. In order for Muslim women to opt into a secular law over
not simply a formal right but a religious obligation without which a marriage is invalid. See
MAHMOOD, supra note 82, at 66-68.
213 See generally SALEEM AKHTAR, SHAH BANO JUDGEMENT IN ISLAMIC
PERSPECTIVE (1994). In the Shah Bano case, it was argued that the increased pressure on the
Waqfboards would place them in serious financial jeopardy.
214 See DESAI, supra note 90, at 101.
215 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 145, at 227. See also Agnes, supra note 142.
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their religious law, they would have to convince their own family and their
prospective spouse's family that such a choice is beneficial for both sides
and that it is religiously effective (that is, the marriage is still valid under
the religion). Faced with such a choice and the subsequent pressures that are
likely to be placed on them to not opt into a secular family law, Muslim
women may be unable or unwilling to jeopardize their religious and familial
affiliations. This is particularly true in a society where they face
discrimination from the majority and need their communities for protection
and support.
Furthermore, an assumption of free choice in a traditional society is
unwarranted and fails to account for the disparities in class or economic
capability, and therefore agency among Indian-Muslim women.2t 6 Codes
that require Muslim women to make a choice and put the burden on them to
secure their own rights with respect to their religious community do not
sufficiently guarantee rights to those Indian-Muslim women who are most
vulnerable-the poor and uneducated women.217
Muslim women's subordination cannot be remedied by a solution
that places the onus on vulnerable women and reinforces the public/private
split through the enactment of another optional code. As evidenced by the
ongoing debate, the SMA 1954-which is, in fact, an opt-in secular law-
has not replaced the dominance of Muslim Personal Law. Another secular
opt-in statute may find itself in similar disuse or under-use. Moreover, in
light of the ideological erosion of secularism due to co-optation by the
Hindu Right, formal rights enacted by a state without the political will to
challenge gender inequality may not amount to real gains for women.
Nevertheless, Muslim women deserve change and equality. The following
section examines both the justifications for resistance to change and the
solution to gender discrimination offered by Muslim traditionalists.
216 For more on capabilities and development, see AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT
AS FREEDOM (2000).
217 See MacKinnon, supra note 97, at 199 (describing how women would invoke
the opt-in code). Indeed, MacKinnon acknowledges that her option requires women to
actively make a choice via litigation. She claims that once one woman has litigated in the
area, many other women would pursue the same choice and the social pressure to conform to
traditional rules would dissipate, leading ultimately to the invalidation of the personal laws
as they stand. Id. at 202. This raises the question of enforcement of the law. While the area
of family law may be settled, it is unclear whether women would not have to litigate to
enforce their choices. One may note that alimony and child support judgments routinely
require enforcement action in the United States.
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B. Muslim Personal Law as Immutable: Identitarian Arguments from
Muslim Conservatives
Muslim scholars have argued from a variety of positions that
Muslim Personal Law ought not to be tampered with by the Indian
judiciary. 2 18 Because the Muslim Personal Law is such a key element of
group identity, attempts to control, change, or reform the law by the
judiciary or the state are perceived as a direct threat to Muslims. And since
the state is put in a position where its legal right to reform or enact new
laws in the area of Personal Law is socially impolitic, the result has been a
stalemate. Where the state has enacted law, it has been in response to
conservative Muslim pressure and at the expense of women, as exemplified
by the legislative response to the Shah Bano case.2 19 Conservative Muslim
men who control the Muslim Personal Law Board (which has fashioned
itself as the ultimate authority on Islamic law in India)220 typically make
arguments like those of Tahir Mahmood and Saleem Akhtar, relying on
formal arguments about Islam and its benevolence towards women to
discredit the real subordination of women in their communities. Armed with
verses from the Qur'an and sayings of the Prophet, they seek to challenge
the allegations made by progressive Muslims and Hindu nationalists
alike.22'
The first argument from conservatives is that the law is immutable.
The sacredness of the law, or so the argument runs, prevents it from being
changed to suit the preferences of certain elements of the community.
222
This argument simply does not hold up under scrutiny. Islamic law has been
an evolving body with a great deal of variation between madhahib, or
218 See, e.g., MOHAMMAD SHABBIR, MUSLIM PERSONAL LAW AND JUDICIARY
(1988).
219 See Narain, supra note 9, at 58.
220 See M. J. Akbar, How Personal is the Law?, ARAB NEWS, July 28, 2003,
http://www.arabnews.com/?page=7&section=0&article=29460&d=28&m=7&y=2003.
221 See, e.g., MAHMOOD, supra note 82.
222 See, e.g., All India Muslim Personal Law Bd., Aims and Objectives,
http://www.aimplboard.org/aims.html (last visited, Nov. 13, 2007); see also SHABBIR, supra
note 218, at 324 ("[Shari'a] is not the creation of moral beings and worldly agencies. It is a
Divine Endowment to the Muslims and is true, authentic, and well-tested for all time to
come. The allegation that radical departure from Shariat are demanded for and necessitated
by the changing concept of state and society and their consequent obligations towards
individuals as a unit as well as a group, are unfounded and baseless.").
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223
schools of jurisprudence, and sects. Moreover, the colonial intervention
in most Muslim countries has meant a grafting of European juridical
constructs onto Islamic law and the replacement of Islamic law with civil
codes.224 Indeed, in many countries, all but the family law is governed by
imported European legal norms.225 But most importantly, the argument that
law is immutable can be dismissed for the reason that the British
codification does not reflect all the law, or even the most important parts of
the law. As Jalal notes, the very act of codification required the exercise of
choice and the imposition of a nationwide uniformity that was absent in the
real practices of Muslims. 226 This argument, deployed one-sidedly by
Muslim patriarchs, should not bar attempts at reform towards greater gender
equity.
The second argument from conservatives is that the law is
misapplied. First, with regard to mahr, as Mahmood argues, the current
practices in the Muslim community are often based on customary usage
rather than classical Islamic law. 2 7 Traditionally, Hindu families paid the
groom a bride price as part of the marriage.228 Oftentimes, this price was
exorbitant, putting the bride's family into debt upon her marriage.229 The
Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961 banned dowry or bride price in the Hindu
tradition in India after women began to be murdered by their husbands on
223 See, e.g., Alan M. Guenther, Hanafi Fiqh in Mughal India: The Fatawa-i
Alamgiri, in INDIA'S ISLAMIC TRADITIONS, 711-1750, at 209, 209-10 (Richard M. Eaton ed.,
2003) ("[T]he shari'a as interpreted by all the schools retained a dynamism enabling it to be
adapted by the theorists and practitioners to meet the needs of the evolving Muslim
communities. The rulings attributed to the founders of the school [madhab] were thus
expanded, with the resulting commentaries and abridgments becoming further authorities for
succeeding generations.").
224 See Lama Abu-Odeh, The Politics of (Mis)recognition: Islamic Law Pedagogy
in American Academia, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 789, 813-23 (discussing European legal scholars'
tendency, despite this grafting, to study traditional Muslim law as distinguished from the
transplanted Western law that is applied in Muslim countries).
225 Id. at 814.
226 See JALAL, SELF AND SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 17, at 145.
227 See MA-MOOD, supra note 82, at 42, 67.
228 See, e.g., id at 67 (discussing the confusion of mahr with dowry); PARASHAR,
supra note 17, at 26 (discussing dowry deaths); RAJAN, supra note 146, at 203-06.
229 RAJAN, supra note 146, at 203-06.
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account of insufficient dowry. 230 The Islamic dower, unlike a bride price,
distributes wealth to women rather than away from them. Moreover, a
woman has full rights to this property and it is unalienable by her husband
or her father.231 The position advocated in this Article is in agreement with
Mahmood that if the giving of mahr is practiced according to Muslim law,
it is a source of security for women in a society that provides no social
safety net. Moreover, because they are able to negotiate the amount, a
bride's family can stipulate a high mahr to deter unilateral divorce and
abandonment; in fact, some states enacted legislation in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries to protect husbands from having to pay
unconscionably high mahr, which indicates that mahr was historically used
broadly and effectively as a protection for Muslim brides.232 If the law were
enforced, Muslim women would be financially more secure and less likely
to be divorced without their consent. Second, the triple talaq, which is the
most disfavored form recognized in Islam, is incorrectly practiced by
Muslim men. The way in which men have used it-in one sitting-is
disapproved of because it contravenes the rules set out in the Qur'an 233
Nevertheless, it is still a valid form of divorce, even if there is a "mild"
exhortation against its use. And finally, maintenance for three months may
be adequate if a divorced wife has contracted for an adequate mahr that she
may leave with or has prospects of remarriage or self-support. According to
apologists like Mahmood, women's "independence" from their husbands
(their status as members of their paternal families and their ability to
remarry) is the underlying reason for the lack of adequate maintenance at
the end of a divorce.234
But ultimately, arguments that dismiss the gender inequities of the
formal Muslim law are unconvincing in light of experiences like that of
Shah Bano who, at the age of 73, did not have many prospects of
remarriage, nor is it likely that there was much of her paternal family left to
support her. Assessed realistically, and as it is currently formulated and
230 See ROMA MUKHERJEE, LEGAL STATUS AND REMEDIES FOR WOMEN IN INDIA 116
(1997).
231 See supra notes 100-121 and accompanying text.
232 See Agnes, supra note 142, at 109.
233 Ramala Baxamusa, Need for Change in the Muslim Personal Law Relating to
Divorce in India, in PROBLEMS OF MUSLIM WOMEN IN INDIA 18, 21 (Asghar Ali Engineer ed.,
1995).
234 See MAHMOOD, supra note 82, at 75-77.
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interpreted, except with regard to mahr, Muslim Personal Law is
undeniably unjust towards women. As the various reform attempts by
Islamic states attest, formal inequality of the law, as well as its impact upon
women's lives and relationships, is an issue that even countries far more
religiously homogenous than India must grapple with. 35 Further, the ways
in which the laws have been interpreted have exacerbated their
discriminatory effects. Since the start of British colonization, the shari'a
has been misconstrued by those who sought to apply it without any
background in Islamic jurisprudence.236 The British abolished the Qadi
courts in 1864, transferring jurisdiction to civil courts with an attached mufti
(legal advisor).237 Eventually, British judges began to read Islamic law and
apply it themselves, often erroneously. 238 This tendency in the courts has
outlasted British rule, as evidenced by the dicta in the Shah Bano
judgment. 239 The result has been misapplication of shari'a to the detriment
of women.
Solutions for the improvement of Muslim women's lives that rely
exclusively on better and more rigorous application of the Muslim Personal
Laws cannot remedy the effects of formal inequalities in the law. As such,
they cannot be taken as workable proposals. Yet, religious laws and
interpretation should not be abandoned to the hegemony of traditionalists.
In the next section, this Article offers an alternative approach that seeks to
reform religious laws in partnership with secularists and with the support of
the state.
C. Internal Reform, Legal Assistance and External Reform
Misapplication of the Muslim Personal Law and the patriarchal
construction put on it has disadvantaged women a great deal. Changes in
substantive practices to conform to the laws as they are written would
indeed be an improvement over what is now practiced. However, proper
application is simply not enough. In the absence of an impartially-applied,
secular, and feminist uniform civil code, reform and change of the Muslim
235 See e.g., infra note 240 and accompanying text.
236 See MAHMOOD, supra note 82, at 51-52.
237 id.
238 Id.
239 SALEEM AKHTAR, SHAH BANO JUDGEMENT IN ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE 255 (1994)
(quoting Muhammad Ahmad Khan v. Shah Bano, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 945, 951 (India)).
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Personal Law is the only option available for Muslim women to better their
lives until such a time when the code can be effectively promulgated. 240 I
suggest a three-pronged approach to internal reform.
L Internal Change: Muslim PersonalLaw Reform
First, Muslim personal laws be must be changed to give women
rights similar to those of their counterparts in other communities. However,
this Article proposes that those laws, such as mahr, that distribute wealth
towards women, be maintained and enforced. Although the state must
ultimately promulgate a reformed code, it is clear from the above arguments
that under the current circumstance, such a move originating from the state
would be unlikely. As such, reform must come from within, with elite
Muslim women and men taking the lead in reinterpreting Islamic texts in
favor of gender equity and advocating for poorer Muslim women.
As An-Naim has argued, Islamic texts can bear several different
interpretations. 24 1 A progressive hermeneutics would create the space for
women to press for their rights under Islamic laws as an alternative to the
unpredictable secularism of the state. Changes to prohibit the triple talaq,
grant women the right to initiate divorce, and prohibit polygamy would be
the first steps towards gender justice. Such measures have already been
240 See Sunder, supra note 15. Many Muslim women are attempting to create an
alternative to either acceptance of traditional constructions and codifications of shari'a or
leaving the faith for secularism. However, this third approach of "finding" or "interpreting"
Islamic texts in line with gender-just laws and human rights-an approach that this Article
advocates-is still a half measure compared to ensuring completely fair laws. Regardless of
interpretation, there are provisions in the Qur'an that, notwithstanding feats of hermeneutical
acrobatics, admit little by way of formal equality for women. One example of such a
provision, despite the fact that it was at the time a protective and perhaps progressive
revelation, is that women inherit only half the share of that of a brother:
Allah enjoins you concerning your children: The male shall have the
equal of the portion of two females; then if they are more than two
females, they shall have two-thirds of what the deceased has left, and if
there is one, she shall have the half; and as for his parents, each of them
shall have the sixth of what he has left if he has a child, but if he has no
child and (only) his two parents inherit him, then his mother shall have
the third; but if he has brothers, then his mother shall have the sixth after
(the payment of) a bequest he may have bequeathed or a debt.
QUR'AN 04:11 (Pickthall translation), available at http://www.usc.edu/deptvMSA/quran/
004.qmt.html.
241 See AN-NA'IM, supra note 22.
98 Columbia Journal of Gender and Law [Vol. 17:1
instituted in other Muslim countries such as Tunisia.24 2 Moreover,
standardization of the nikahnama (marriage contract) to limit the right to
triple talaq has been proposed and promulgated.243 Though in this iteration
it remains inadequate and far from the model proposed by progressive
Muslim women, it is a sign of progress indicating that Muslim women are
impacting the debate within religious institutions.
It is unfortunate for Muslim women that the Muslim Law Board,
the institution with the most power over law reform, has not been able to
come to a consensus about these issues. 2 44 Yet, pressure for change
continues to mount from Muslim women through the All India Muslim
Women's Law Board (AIMWLB) which was organized in 2005 to press for
gender-sensitive reform of personal laws.245 It is hoped that Muslim women
and the AIMWLB will to continue to press for change without being
deterred by the strategic political claims that such long overdue concessions
threaten Islam. As in other countries, essential elements of Islam in India
will withstand such changes and, indeed, this Article argues that such
reform would be more in keeping with the spirit of justice integral to Islam
than the current laws are.246 Further work on model reforms needs to be
242 See LAW & RELIGION PROGRAM OF EMORY UNIV., supra note 143 (example of
Tunisian law).
243 See Balraj Puri, Nikahnama-A Reply to Triple Talaq, DECCAN HERALD, Aug.
13, 2004, available at http://www.deccanherald.com/archives/aug I32004/edst.asp;
'Nikahnama' Cites Uniform Code for Muslim Marriages, ECONOMIC TIMES, May 2, 2005,
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshowarchive.cms?msid=1094570 (noting that
while the accepted uniform Nikahnama is an improvement, it still allows for the use of triple
talaq as a last resort). Unfortunately, this may not be much of a disincentive to men who
wish to discard their wives. Arguably, Islamic law has always considered the use of triple
talaq as a last resort. The amendments to the Nikahnama proposed by women members of
the AIMPLB and women activists such as the Muslim Mahila Organization, such as an
advocate for the woman during the marriage, the limitation of talaq, and the right to restrict
polygamy, were not adopted. See Ravi Sharma, A Missed Opportunity, FRONTLINE, Nov. 11-
24, 2000, available at http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl1723/17231010.htm.
244 See e.g., India Muslim Divorce Code Set Out, May 2, 2005, BBC NEWS,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south asia/4504889.stm; Sutapa Mukerjee, India's Muslims Face
Up to Rifts, BBC NEWS, Feb. 9, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/southasia/4235999.stm;
Geeta Pandey, Muslim Women Fight Instant Divorce, BBC NEWS, Aug. 4, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/southasia/3530608.stm.
245 See K.S. Dakshina Murthy, Bid to Reform Muslim Personal Law Fails,
HINDUSTAN TIMES, Oct. 31, 2000, available at http:/www.hvk.org/articles/1000/101.html.
246 See generally supra note 143 (where other countries have changed their laws to
more equitable arrangements).
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undertaken by groups such as AIMWLB in cooperation with secular
feminists, and then vigorously advocated among Muslims.
2. Practical Assistance: Both Economic Empowerment and Teaching
Women to Use the Law
Lest reform become a hollow formality, a second prong of this
solution is the need for community action and the provision of legal aid to
247the poor beyond criminal matters. Few writers have taken up the class
dimensions of the subordination of Muslim women in India.248
Undoubtedly, family wealth and education has a large part to play in
whether a woman will be deprived of her rights, whether she has the agency
and the support to be able to bargain effectively or litigate, and the extent to
which religious laws will be deployed against her. 249 In a comparable
context, it has been found that ignorance of the law has been used against
women particularly with regard to property rights. In Bangladesh, nonprofit
organizations have begun an aggressive campaign to educate women about
their legal rights:
The legal aid clinics are designed to help BRAC members as well
as poor community members resolve their conflicts either
through local arbitration or through the formal legal system by
providing them with legal advice and assistance. The legal aid
programme deals with issues like dowry, dower and maintenance,
polygamy, divorce, hila marriage, physical torture, land related
matters, money related matters, rape, acid throwing, kidnapping,
trafficking and fraud.
Through this legal intervention, BRAC has begun changing the
traditional system of arbitration that discriminates against the
poor and particularly against women. Instead of having decisions
imposed upon them by traditional elites (mostly men) through the
system of shalish (informal village courts), women can now
participate in a process of arbitration facilitated by BRAC, which
247 See INDIA CONST. art. 39A, available at http://lawmin.nic.in/coi.htm.
248 See RAJAN, supra note 146, at 159.
249 See Sushila Jain, The Process of Modernization in India and the Changing
Status of Muslim Women, in PROBLEMS OF MUSLIM WOMEN IN INDIA 52 (Asghar Ali
Engineer ed., 1995); Syed Mehdi Husain, Muslim Women and Higher Education: A Case
Study of Hyderabad, in PROBLEMS OF MUSLIM WOMEN IN INDIA 72 (Asghar Ali Engineer ed.,
1995).
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tries to enforce laws established to protect the rights of women.
Although BRAC has no formal power to enforce the decisions
taken during the process of arbitration, the people against whom
complaints are made always know that a formal case could be
brought against them if they do not comply with the informal
arbitration. When arbitration fails, BRAC forwards the
complaints to ASK selected panel lawyers and they in turn take
necessary action to file a regular case in the local court.
250
Similarly, the United States-based organization Global Rights has
instituted a program that uses hairdressers and quilting clubs in Morocco as
channels through which vital information about women's rights regarding
marriage contracts and mahr agreements is disseminated. 5
In India, the need for education of the Muslim population with
regard to the current misunderstanding and misapplication of mahr has been
recognized within the communities. 252 Poor Muslim women and Indian
women in general would benefit greatly from such practical assistance that
gives meaning and substance to the formal rights that they may have. Such
an endeavor would require investment by the elites within the communities,
partnered with external agencies and progressive feminist movements, to
create and foster effective channels for legal information.
3. A Parallel Code: Drafting a Model UCC and Advocating Its Passage
Finally, it is suggested that Indian secular feminists, in partnership
with religious feminists, draft a model UCC. While it may never be
legislated, a model UCC drafted by women would give women a standard
by which to judge their formal rights. It would make concrete the
aspirations of Indian women and create a point of focus around which
women can rally for their rights. Moreover, it would potentially prevent the
250 Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), Social Development,
Human Rights and Legal Services, http://www.brac.net/legalaidclinics.htm (last visited Mar.
21, 2006).
251 Interview with Aisha Bain and Jennifer Rasmussen at Global Rights on Jan. 16,
2007 (notes on file with author). See also GLOBAL RIGHTS, CONSOLIDATING REGIONAL
INITIATIVE: LOCAL NETWORKS FOR WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS IN MOROCCO (Jan. 2006),
available at http://www.globalrights.org/site/DocServer/GRMoroccoRegional_lnitiative_
InterimReport.pdf'?doclD=4583.
252 Maulana Asrarul Haque Qasmi, Dire Need of Reform in Muslim Society, MILLI




promulgation of a UCC by ideologues intent on using women's rights as an
instrument for furthering an assimilationist agenda and without regard for
improving the experience of Indian women.
Several model codes have already been proposed by various groups
in India. Flavia Agnes has reviewed some of the most important ones;
however, she concludes that none of the codes are satisfactory.253 Despite
the common goals of improving the lot of women and children, the codes
grapple with and are ultimately unable to reconcile formal equality with
substantive equality. The more important contribution of Agnes's work is
that it provides a basis on which to differentiate a new attempt at a secular
code. Her analysis of the codes drafted thus far reveals the following issues:
1. The imposition of a Uniform Civil Code from above is
not recommended. Education and a campaign for the
code must also be undertaken.
254
2. If the goal is to improve the circumstances of women
and children, then the recommendations must be based
on notions of substantive equality. Use of
undifferentiated terms such as "spouse" is likely to
deteriorate women's rights.
255
3. Abolishing polygamy through compulsory registration
of marriages forms the "core of the controversy over
Uniform Civil Code." The codes recognize the problem
of polygamy but are unsuccessful in recommending
viable solutions. There have been two contradictory
tendencies in the proposed solution: i) more stringent
punishments of breaches of the anti-bigamy provisions,
and ii) the recognition of women and children in de
facto bigamous/polygamous relationships.
256
253 AGNES, supra note 162, at 186-88.
254 Id. at 186-87.
255 d. at 187.
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4. Women's organizations have begun to move away from
marriage as a moral idea and a means to regulate sexual
relations to marriage as an economic contract.
257
5. The drafts are based on one of two premises:
i) Women as a class are non-working spouses
and their only contribution is unpaid domestic
labour, or ii) Men and women are equal
partners and hence their rights, duties and
responsibilities are equal and of a similar
nature. A third category of women, who are the
sole providers of their families, are invisible in
this debate. The recommendations do not
protect these women who shoulder the double
burden as wage earners and home makers. The
implications of introducing the concept of joint
family property and equal right to matrimonial
home and maintenance etc. using a gender
neutral term spouse would be detrimental to the
rights of these women, most of whom belong to
the marginalized sections of society.
258
It is interesting to note that the Muslim Personal Law has none of
these issues to beleaguer it. It acknowledges the economic nature of the
marriage relationship.2 5 9 As it protects women's property by removing it
from the reach of a husband or father, Muslim law prevents the divestment
of resources from women.260 Thus, regardless of whether a woman is the
sole earner, an equal partner, or a dependant, her property is legally
protected. Further, by acknowledging polygamy, it protects women and
children who are in de facto polygamous relationships.
261
Naturally a secular code would have to resolve these issues in order
to be applicable to all women without regard to religion. Women's groups
working together are more likely to produce a viable code if they place
economic considerations at the fore and demote the importance of
257 Id.
211 Id. at 188.
259 See supra notes 100-121 and accompanying text discussing mahr.
260 Id.
261 See supra notes 139-143 and accompanying text on polygamy.
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polygamy in the code. The polygamy issue will only become less sensitive
when the Muslim community itself is forced or chooses to reform it.
In the end, the byzantine system of personal law in India that
requires familiarity with a number of religious traditions is a burden on the
judiciary. Although it may be in keeping with the ethos of religious
pluralism and equality among religions that the framers held so dear, the
state cannot continue to uphold religious laws that conflict with
fundamental rights and justify the subordination of women on this basis.
Further, male leaders of the religious community cannot continue to use and
control women as a symbol of identity by politicizing their rights. For these
reasons, an effort needs to be made to move towards a system that can
afford women their rights while respecting their religious communities. As
either a step towards a civil code or as an end in itself, Muslim Personal
Law reform is long overdue.
IV. WHEN AND WHY LAW MATTERS: THE PLACE OF LEGAL
REFORM IN FEMINIST ACTIVISM
Law reform may be overdue; however, the question remains as to
whether it will make a difference in women's lives-whether it will matter.
In its final section, this Article considers the arguments about the relevance
of law in the lives of women. The first is a general argument about
limitations on the ability of the law to transform the norms of a society.
Nivedita Menon's Recovering Subversion: Feminist Politics Beyond the
Law extends Western feminists' legal critiques to the Indian context and,
therefore, it is fair to use her as an example of this important line of
critique.262 While Menon does restate the critique of formal rights-a
subject that has already been discussed above-this Article is more
interested in her observation that projects focused on legal reform are a
proxy for serious movement-building. Thus, the focus is on the part of her
argument that discusses social movements as a better alternative to legal
reform.
Menon argues that rather than working to change laws or legal
norms, such social movements should seek to do the much harder work of
changing societal norms. This is an extremely important argument because
it highlights the weaknesses that can exist in feminist activism where it
conflates laws with the norms by which women actually live. Such a
conflation considers changes in law as having a consequential
transformative impact on society. For the most part, such normative
262 See MENON, supra note 8, at 3-9.
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changes are either non-existent or very slow to materialize.263 However, this
is not to say that change driven by the law does not happen. In the Indian
context, despite the tortured history of law as a tool of the civilizing mission
of empire upon its subjects,6 it has had a visible effect in some areas. For
instance, the laws banning sati, though they have not completely eradicated
the ritual, have made sati difficult to practice on a broad societal scale.265
This is not a negation of the anti-formalist argument that law has a limited
impact; nevertheless, a limited impact may be better than no change at all.
The lesson from this experience ought to be that law reform should not be
abandoned because of the limited impact of "rights." And in the absence of
evidence of the real harms that institutionalization of a different
configuration of rights may produce, such arguments are unpersuasive.
Furthermore, the importance of legal change for subaltern groups
cannot be so easily dismissed by members in the dominant community. As
Patricia Williams says about the Critical Legal Studies movement, which
has been the chief theoretical location of these critiques, and its dismissal of
"rights":
For blacks, . . . the battle is not deconstructing rights, in a world
of no rights; nor of constructing statements of need, in a world of
abundantly apparent need. Rather, the goal is to find a political
mechanism that can confront the denial of need. The argument
that rights are disutile, even harmful, trivializes this aspect of
black experience specifically, as well as that of any person or
group whose genuine vulnerability has been protected by that
measure of actual entitlement which rights provide.266
While it cannot be said that Muslim women have had no rights, there has
been little by way of progress in obtaining more equitable rights. Further,
enforcement of whatever rights exist has been heavily mediated by
263 Id. at 34-35.
264 Id. at 8. See generally UDAY SINGH MEHTA, LIBERALISM AND EMPIRE: A STUDY
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY BRITISH LIBERAL THOUGHT (1999).
265 See, e.g., Monmayee Basu, Hindu Women and Marriage Law: From Sacrament
to Contract, in WOMEN AND LAW IN INDIA 34 (2004) (noting that social reformers, women,
and legislators sought to tackle the various problems facing Indian society).
261 Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from




customary practices, societal norms, and political considerations. 267 And, as
Williams so aptly notes with regard to the Black experience in the United
States, the law has enshrined "rights" for dominant groups at the expense of
the subordinated.268 Translating this to the Indian context, rights have
similarly privileged majority groups (whether they be religious or gender
groups, including those constructed as such) in ways that have harmed
Muslim women. Thus, while focusing solely on rights may be unwise, to
give up on them completely is premature despite the relevance of the
critique. Put another way, rights are already encoded into the law and, for
the most part, they distribute resources toward Muslim men and prefer
Muslim men to Muslim women. To give up on the fight for just laws, even
in the form of rights, does nothing to redress the already existing imbalance
that these encoded entitlements provide.
Second and equally important are the arguments that shari'a-at
least in its formal sense-has a limited impact on the quotidian lives of
Muslims, that legal considerations do not necessarily shape the identity or
behavior of Muslims, and that economic factors are far more important with
regard to both than the legal codes to which Muslims are subject. Zoya
Hasan's The Diversity of Muslim Women's Lives in India articulates this
line of critique. 269 According to Hasan, far too much attention has been paid
to the legal codes that govern Muslims and far too little to the actual
subjects of the code. 270 As a result, rather than illuminating the needs of the
diverse body of people who adhere to Islam in India, these attempts have
obscured those needs by reducing them to the singular identity fixed in
those codes.271 In other words, the fantasy Muslim contemplated by the
imperial creators of the personal law code has overshadowed the multi-
dimensional, diverse, and much more complex people who adhere to Islam
(or who are secular Muslims) in India. Furthermore, concentration on law
obscures the more important issues facing Muslims that are primarily socio-
economic.
Undoubtedly, economic considerations are of paramount
importance to the vast majority of Muslims, far more so than proposed legal
codes that may never come into play in their lives. Nevertheless, many
267 See supra Part I.
268 See Williams, supra note 266.
269 See DIVERSITY OF MUSLIM WOMEN'S LivEs, supra note 3.
270 Id. at 3.
271 Id. at 3-4.
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Muslims still consider Islamic legal justifications to be important to their
behavior and often seek to justify their actions by referring to the sunnah, or
the ways of the Prophet according to Islamic tradition, as evidence of their
rectitude. Despite the largely symbolic nature of this linkage (that is to say,
shari 'a in its entirety is not adhered to in any coherent way), the very fact
that shari'a enters the conversation to Islamicize and therefore legitimize
various practices requires one to take the formal law somewhat more
seriously. 272 If the law can be shown to be different than common usage and
practice, as it classically is, and women are given the power to refute facile
justifications based on dubious religious law, perhaps some normative
change would be aided. For instance, as mentioned above, Global Rights
uses quilting bees and hairdressers to disseminate legal information to
women. 273 Such information, which has often been denied to women, is
critical in protecting them from divestiture and fraudulent appropriation of
their resources. Thus, to claim that law or knowledge of the law has no
impact on women's lives would be an oversimplification.
Of course, the positive impact of the law is greatest when it is
deployed in protection of women's economic resources, so legal reform
must be done in conjunction with economic protection and redistribution
that assists poor Muslim women. Keeping in mind the role that law might
play, as has been argued above, part of that redistribution ought to be in the
form of legal aid that prevents those Muslim women from losing what few
resources they may have.
The other side to this critique is a warning that law reform and
legislative actions tend to create ossification and diminish the fluidity of
identities. This has been well theorized by Wendy Brown in States of Injury
and by Menon. 274 It is also clearly reflected in the empirical research of
Hasan, who warns that the focus on Islamic law has occluded Muslims as
subjects and agents who have multifaceted, complex identities and
experiences. 275 These are extremely valuable contributions in correcting the
way that Muslims are viewed by dominant society and also in the way that
they have been projected by Muslim Traditionalists. Nevertheless, the
problem remains that, regarding the codification of Muslim Personal Laws,
272 Id.
273 See GLOBAL RIGHTS, supra note 251 and accompanying text on Global Rights
Morocco program.
274 See DIVERSITY OF MUSLIM WOMEN'S LIVES, supra note 3, at 47-54; WENDY
BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE MODERNITY 128-29 (1995).
275 See DIVERSITY OF MUSLIM WOMEN'S LIVES, supra note 3, at 3-4.
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a certain fantasy of a unitary persona or community as "Muslims" has
already become part of the bedrock of the Indian family law system.
Moreover, that identity has been shaped, as discussed above, first by the
administrative needs of the British during colonialism, and second by the
politics of nationalism and partition. The laws that exist as Muslim Personal
Laws are an amalgam of different legal sources (including customary
practice, classical shari'a and British liberal traditions reinterpreting
classical laws to be less "illiberal"). 276 A fear of enshrining a different set of
identities is certainly anxiety-provoking and legitimate, but less so than
leaving unchallenged or unchanged the current identities that were
determined by a colonial ruling authority. The warning that this critique
offers is that, without a great deal of thought and care, legal reform may
result in the formation of identities and relationships between dominant and
subaltern that are undesirable and that may become ossified. Thus, in light
of this risk, legal reform must proceed from careful assessment of the
impact of changing or reformulating identities in such a way that reveals
what actual distribution of resources such moves would yield.
Given the dual nature of Indian law, having both a secular and a
religious component, any movement towards unification of the code into a
singular instrument raises the question of legitimacy. That is to say, in
addition to being subject to the critiques raised above, a secular code would
also require some grounds on which it would be acceptable to the majority
of Indians. The Muslim Personal Law, insofar as it purports to be based on
shari'a, derives its legitimacy from religion, as do the other religious
personal law codes. However, in order for a secular code to be acceptable, it
too must be legitimized. Generally, the proponents for such legitimacy have
resorted to some form of shared values, experience, or "universal" norms.
27 7
Yet, such notions of universality raise concerns of assimilation, as argued
above, and in a nation as diverse as India, it is hard to advocate for any kind
of "cultural" universality that might undergird such a reform.27' This
problem is part of the "sameness versus difference" debate that Menon
outlines.279 However, here we are confronted with the issue of similarity
among women in different religious groups. The assumption that all women
276 See supra notes 20-42 and accompanying text.
277 See, e.g., NUSSBAUM, supra note 145, at 34-41.
278 Nussbaum's arguments notwithstanding, it seems that one of the main problems
in India is the difficulty of discovering truly "universal" values that are comprehended in the
same manner in different contexts and cultures. See id.
279 See MENON, supra note 8, at 54-59.
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have some shared experience from which legal reform might derive
legitimacy hides the many differences that also exist. Such a presumed and
legally constructed difference was the basis for the enactment of the various
personal law codes. 280 This is a dilemma that cannot easily be overcome
because the problem of finding legitimacy for the code arises in part from
the problem that legal reform is often a proxy for movement building-that
is, differences overshadow similarities such that agreement about
similarities is hard to come by. In order for a secular code to have
legitimacy, there must be a strong social movement with members of the
various groups in agreement about the goals of the code. The multiple
constituencies that the code purports to govern must be equal stakeholders
in the formulation of a gender-equitable code that is sensitive to difference
as well. Where there is a lack of such a movement or the movement is led
by dominant groups, the result may simply be the kind of encoding of
privileges for dominant women that the personal law codes provide with
regard to men. In other words, for the secular code to be accepted, it must
be the product of a social movement that encompasses subalterns and that is
not a top-down imposition of "universal" values. Such a movement has yet
to materialize with force in India, particularly one that reconciles the class
and economic differences among women. However, it is a goal towards
which many women's organizations strive. And as this Article has argued, a
draft model code that emerges from such a broad coalitional movement
would be a legitimate reflection of the demands and desires of many if not
most Indian women.
CONCLUSION
With the continued politicization of law and the equation of
religious law as identity, India has moved farther away from the goal of a
uniform civil code. Yet it is unfair to hold the religious minorities solely
culpable for this unfortunate development. As argued above, the rise of
Hindu nationalism in the 1990s and continuing to the present has created a
situation in which "secular" law has been deployed as a punitive,
1 28 1 Tevernacular of Hindutva
assimilative instrument against minorities. The
and its acceptance by the judiciary has reserved to Hindus the very identity
of "Indian," constructing Muslims, Christians, and Jews as "other." More
280 See supra notes 20-42 and accompanying text.
281 See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, IDENTITY AND VIOLENCE: THE ILLUSION OF DESTINY
(2006); AMARTYA SEN, THE ARGUMENTATIVE INDIAN: WRITINGS ON INDIAN HISTORY,
CULTURE AND IDENTITY (2005).
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disturbingly, the co-optation of secular institutions-including the judiciary,
long held to be the least political institution of the state-for the purpose of
propagating Hindutva, gives minorities very real reasons to be wary of a
precipitous move towards more secular laws.282 Moreover, the Right's co-
optation of the issue of women's rights has made it difficult for women's
groups to push for a uniform civil code without aligning themselves with
the Right. While a uniform civil code, under the right circumstances-a
more robust secularism, a depoliticization of religious identity, more
support for progressive Muslims-would improve the formal rights of
women, the likelihood of these circumstances occurring is uncertain at best.
This Article has argued that the best approach in the interim is for radical
reform of Muslim Personal Law coupled with the drafting of an aspirational
code that is then advocated for vigorously.
Muslim women are not mute subaltems as they have sometimes
been portrayed, nor are they the victim-caricatures that many feminist
scholars seem to believe them to be.283 They have been at the forefront of
major reform movements all over the Islamic world and India is no
different. It is unfortunate that organizations like the Muslim Personal Law
Board have exerted a monopoly over the conversation about Muslim
women's rights; however, even in such conservative organizations, Muslim
women are making inroads and pushing back.284 Unfortunately, their efforts
have been hampered. The co-optation of their cause, the discourse engaged
in by women's rights groups that pits religion against gender, and the
discourse of the Right that pits Muslims against Hindus have taken on a
patina of colonialism. 285 As a result, religious communities, which are both
a location of succor and support for Muslim women, are also a location of
control and a barrier against outside influence. Muslim women find
themselves caught between the Scylla of community and the Charybdis of a
sometimes hostile state, a racist majoritarian ideology, and a majority
population that seems to support it. Until the state is no longer a major site
of oppression for all Muslims, until Muslim women's particular experience
at the intersection of gender and religion is taken seriously by dominant
women's groups, and until the discourse of women's rights in general is
282 See supra notes 161-177 and accompanying text.
283 See, e.g., supra note 9 (these authors are good examples of such scholars).
284 See, e.g., Pandey, supra note 244; Geeta Pandey, Women Battle on with Mosque
Plan, BBC NEws, Aug. 19, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/southasia/4165440.stm.
285 See RAJAN, supra note 146.
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reclaimed from the Hindu Right, the efforts of Muslim women to enact
reforms within their own communities and to foster dialogue with secular
feminist groups are the most effective ways to change their lived
experience.
